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Abstract
Medical errors are the third leading cause of death in the U.S., after heart disease and cancer, caus-
ing at least 250,000 deaths every year [1]. These errors are often caused by slips and lapses, which
include, but are not limited to delayed diagnosis, delayed or ineffective therapeutic interventions, and
unintended deviation from the best practice guidelines. These situations may occur more often in acute
care settings, where the staff are overloaded, under stress, and must make quick decisions based on
the best available evidence. An integrated clinical guidance system can reduce such medical errors by
helping medical staff track and assess patient state more accurately and adapt the care plan according
to the best practice guidelines.
However, a main prerequisite for developing a guideline system is to create computer interpretable
representations of the clinical knowledge. The main focus of this thesis is to develop executable clin-
ical models for acute care. We propose an organ-centric pathophysiology-based modeling paradigm,
in which we translate the medical text into executable interactive disease and organ state machines.
We formally verify the correctness and safety of the developed models. Afterward, we integrate the
models into a best practice guidance system. We study the cardiac arrest and sepsis case studies to
demonstrate the applicability of proposed modeling paradigm. We validate the clinical correctness and
usefulness of our model-driven cardiac arrest guidance system in an ACLS training class. We have also
conducted a preliminary clinical simulation of our model-driven sepsis screening system.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
According to ”To Err is Human,” a report by the Institute of Medicine (IoM), medical errors are the
eighth leading cause of death among Americans causing close to 100,000 deaths every year [2]. Ac-
cording to the most recent study that comes nearly two decades after this IoM report, medical errors has
become the third leading cause of death in the U.S., after heart disease and cancer, and annual number
of deaths has increased to 250,000 [1]. These preventable errors are often caused by slips and lapses,
which include, but are not limited to delayed diagnosis, delayed or ineffective therapeutic interventions,
and unintended deviation from the best practice guidelines. These situations may occur more often in
acute care settings, where the staff are overloaded, under stress, and must make quick decisions based
on the best available evidence.
One of the main contributing factors to slips and lapses in clinical environments is the lack of in-
tegrated and comprehensive information. According to a study from a Canadian group performed in
2008, the care of critically ill patients generates a median of 1348 individual data points/day and that
this quantity has increased 26% over five years [3]. Medical staff must mentally correlate the individual
data points they observe from standalone devices. This is an error-prone process due to the limitations
of human memory and realtime processing capability. Another contributing factor may be inadequate
alarm configuration policies and practices. As reported by ECRI, which is a non-profit health agency,
alarm hazards are the first item in the list of top 10 health technology hazards that put patients in
hospitals at risk [4].
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An integrated clinical guidance system can reduce such medical errors by helping medical staff
track and assess patient state more accurately and adapt the care plan according to the best practice
guidelines. However, a main prerequisite for developing a guideline system is creating computer in-
terpretable representations of the clinical knowledge contained in best practice guidelines. In other
words, creation of such systems requires considerable amount of modeling activity such as deciding
what patient data is relevant and identifying the concepts and relationships among them that relate to
guideline generations [5]. The main focus of this thesis is on developing executable clinical models
for acute care.
Such clinical models have been and continue to be studied extensively in medical community. How-
ever, the common format used to represent and communicate clinical knowledge, including such mod-
els, is English (text and graphics). Therefore, utilizing these models when providing clinical care can
be as challenging as using a map while driving. Turning maps to GPS based navigation tools has rev-
olutionized driving. Translating pathophysiological models, based in medical best practice text, into
executable models can have a similar effect on the use of computer guidance systems in medicine.
We propose an organ-centric pathophysiology-based modeling paradigm, where we translate the
medical text into executable interactive disease and organ state machines. This is possible because
disease and organ states are already discretized by the medical community, for example, different stages
of cancer, diabetes, heart diseases, etc. Wemodel the patient state and different disease stages according
to pathophysiology of organ systems, which describes how each of the organ functions are affected by
the disease. Furthermore, the diagnosis and treatment are organized for each stage. The developed
models can then be integrated in a guidance system and derive its execution. Next, we look at a simple
illustrative example before discussing the details of our modeling paradigm.
1.1 Illustrative Example
Cardiac arrest is initially the devastating cessation of cardiac activity, which is caused by the loss of
heart’s electrical and muscular pumping function. The cardiovascular organ system is the main organ
affected by this disease. We model the disease according to the pathophysiology of organ systems,
which describes how each of the organ functions are affected by the disease. In cardiac arrest, the
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Figure 1.1: Organ-Centric Pathophysiology-Based Model of Cardiac Arrest
heart rhythm may change and include abnormal or irregular heart rhythms or waveforms (arrhythmias).
Furthermore, insufficient blood circulation in the lungs impedes the CO2 and O2 exchange resulting
in CO2 accumulation in the blood, which may be reflected by elevated blood acidity level indicated by
decrease in blood pH level. The abnormal pH is revealed in arterial blood gas (ABG) test. These are
two examples of pathophysiological changes in cardiovascular organ system caused by cardiac arrest.
To model cardiac arrest, we encode the arrhythmia and blood gas imbalance processes among others,
using finite state machine formalism. In each of these state machines we codify different stages/types of
heart rhythm irregularity or imbalance in arterial blood gas levels according to existing medical knowl-
edge. For example, pulseless electrical activity, a heart rhythm observed on the electrocardiogram that
should be producing a pulse, but is not, is a state in the arrhythmia state machine. Similarly, severe
metabolic acidosis, a very low blood pH , is a state in blood gas imbalance state machine. When new
blood pressure, heart rate, and EKG readings are received and a blood pH value from a recent ABG
test is entered by the nurse, the arrhythmia and blood gas imbalance state machines will transition to
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the appropriate states. Let us assume the current readings indicate a very low blood pressure and blood
pH , no meaningful heart rate reading and an EKG rhythm that is not a flat line but does not produce
a pulse. Therefore, the arrhythmia machine transitions to pulseless electrical activity state and blood
gas imbalance transitions to severe metabolic acidosis. Figure 1.1 shows the state machines modeling
these two pathophysiological processes. Note that we only present a simplified version of cardiac arrest
model to illustrate the concept; more details of the proposed modeling paradigm is presented in Chapter
2 and the more elaborate cardiac arrest model is presented in Chapter 3. In the next section, we discuss
the technical challenges we have identified for developing executable clinical models for acute care.
1.2 Technical Challenges
As mentioned above, the primary contribution of this thesis is development of executable models of
a class of acute care best practice algorithms and the supporting disease models. Therefore, we first
present the major modeling challenges and our proposed solution(s) to address each.
1.2.1 Modeling Challenges
Challenge 1.a: Medical knowledge representation must be in a machine-processable form. The
medical knowledge must translate from text format to a structure appropriate for the logical applica-
tion of that knowledge by a computer guidance system. The developed clinical model(s) should be
executable or must provide a means for automatic execution to facilitate the design of best practice
guidance systems.
Proposed Solution: We translate medical knowledge to executable models using an organ-based
pathophysiological paradigm. We use finite state machine formalism to develop the models. The
models are executable and can directly be used to derive the execution of a best practice guidance
system. The details of model semantics is presented in Section 2.2.
Challenge 1.b: The developed models must encode the relevant clinical information. The model
needs to encode the medical information or knowledge relevant to the disease under study. For exam-
ple, a physician often is interested not only diagnosis itself but also the process of diagnosis and the
clinical data required to make a diagnosis. However, the encoded information must be adequate but not
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excessive such that it creates a mental overload.
Proposed Solution: In Section 2.2, we propose an organ-centric pathophysiology-based modeling
paradigm. We model the changes in patient state according to the pathophysiology of affected or-
gan systems. Different diseases may impair one or more of the physiological functions performed by
different organ systems. Pathophysiology describes the process of such changes in physiological mea-
surements and organ states throughout disease progress. Multiple pathophysiological processes must
often be tracked for each disease. Each pathophysiological state encodes the subset of relevant clini-
cal data required for monitoring the patients state/ assessing patient’s response to a treatment for that
specific state.
Challenge 1.c: The clinical models must be easily understood and validated.
Proposed Solution: Physicians are taught body organ systems and structural relationships within the
body. In addition, the pathophysiological description of disease processes is how medical knowledge is
commonly known by the physicians [6, 7]. Therefore, the developed models would be at the same ab-
straction level that medical knowledge and reasoning are known to physicians. This can make clinical
validation easier and more effective. To check if our model correctly encodes the medical knowledge,
physicians may directly look at the organ models and cross reference with the requirements. In ad-
dition, summarizing the patient data in the form of pathophysiological states leads to easier cognitive
management in realtime. This can also address the first contributing factor to slips and lapses, that is
the lack of integrated and comprehensive patient information.
Challenge 1.d: The modeling paradigm must be applicable to different diseases in acute care.
The medical knowledge representation and modeling methodology must be able to model different
diseases in acute care. To truly evaluate the applicability of a modeling paradigm, different diseases or
acute care scenarios must be studied.
Proposed Solution: We partially address this challenge by applying the proposed modeling to two
case-studies. In Chapter 3, we present cardiac arrest case study and in Chapter 4, we discuss mod-
eling sepsis, which is a life-threatening organ dysfunction caused by a dis-regulated host response to
infection.
Challenge 1.e: The clinical models must have the correct level of abstraction, concurrency
and complexity. Some clinical information, although relevant, may not be needed in the same details
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as others. On the other hand, the model may need to represent dynamic clinical information and track
concurrent state changes. Furthermore, while encoding the relevant information the model must remain
manageable.
Proposed Solution: In Section 2.3, we present a set of modeling guidelines to specifically address
these challenges. We discuss identifying the concurrent pathophysiological processes to be encoded
in the model. We then provide some guidelines on defining the states and transitions for each process
as well as the interaction between different processes. We demonstrate how following the guidelines
can lead to more modular representation, which allows some of the model components to be studied,
analyzed and validated independently of the others.
1.2.2 Additional Design Challenges
Challenge 2: The translation of medical texts into executable models must be clinically correct.
Clinical guidance systems can greatly affect patient safety, and therefore, it is critical to validate their
correctness. However, translating from the usual text approach for communicating knowledge to an
executable structure appropriate for computer processing can be complex. This makes it difficult to
ensure the correctness of the encoded medical knowledge in the models.
Proposed Solution: This is addressed by clinical simulation to be validated by physicians. In
Section 2.7 we discuss the generic approach we have taken for validating the models. More specific
details on validation of the integrated organ-centric pathophysiology-based cardiac arrest models are
presented in Section 3.4. We use Yakindu Statechart Tool (SCT) [8], to develop organ and guideline
models. This is a tool that provides an integrated modeling environment and allows simulation of the
developed model. We have integrated the developed models with an existing guidance system interface,
developed by our group. This allows us to simulate different clinical scenarios and validate the dynamic
behavior of the developed models.
Challenge 3: The desired behaviors must always hold, not just in the limited clinical simula-
tion. In addition to validating the clinical correctness of the developed models using simulation, it is
critical to formally verify the correctness of the models.
Proposed Solution: In Sections 2.5 and 3.2, we address this problem by translating the Yakindu
models to UPPAAL [9] for verification. We specify the set of clinical and system properties in linear
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temporal or computation tree logic. We then use the UPPAAL model checking tool to verify the
satisfaction of the specified properties against the models. Currently the translation is done manually
and the correctness of translation is a challenge to be addressed in the future.
Challenge 4: Physician’s deviation from best practice guidelines must be tracked and recorded.
At times patient states presented by our system may differ from physician understanding and they may
deviate from the best practice guidelines suggested by our system. A source of this inconsistency,
should it occur, is that most guidelines are for average population and there may be information used
by the physician to make a determination but not available to our system.
Proposed Solution: For each pathophysiological state machine we develop a physician belief state
machine, with same static structure. The physician model has the same pathophysiological states;
however, the transition between the states are enabled according to physician’s response to the patient
state suggested by the model. Therefore, the two pathophysiological processes have different active
states at run-time, when the physician deviates. We have added a logging interface to the models that
allows the deviation instances to be logged. Finally, we propose the divergence-convergence protocol to
allow some degree of flexibility, while reducing the unintended deviation from best practice guidelines.
When the physician diverges from the system suggestions, the model still keeps track of the patient
state according to the best practice guidelines and the corresponding alerts are generated if the patient
state deteriorates. However, if the patient state improves the model converges with the physician’s
decision. We present our physician model in Section 2.4.1.
Challenge 5: The developed models must be integrated into the guidance system and derive its
execution.
Proposed Solution: In Section 2.6, we propose a model-driven approach to integrate the developed
models with a guidance system, developed by our group. The models interact with the guidance system
interface using our handwritten communication code. The developed pathophysiological models then
derive the execution of guidance system. This allows us to design alert systems that are integrated with
patient’s pathophysiological states. This is further discussed in the next design challenge.
Challenge 6: An alarm management approach is required to reduce slips and lapse caused
by inadequate alarm configuration and practices. The critically-ill patients’ measurements will be
out of range for most the time and alarms designed based on only single out-of-range measurements
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can result in alarm fatigue and increase the possibility of medical errors. An alarm approach that is
comprehensive and integrated with patient (pathophysiological) state is critical to address this issue.
Additionally, the effectiveness and safety of any proposed alarm management system must be evalu-
ated.
Proposed Solution: In Section 2.4.2, a best practice-defined alert system is proposed, which uses
the concept of actionable alert. An alert is only generated when a new monitoring and/or treatment
action must be performed by medical staff. This often occurs when disease and/or organ state is transi-
tioning towards or has transitioned to a worse stage as defined by the medical best practice guidelines.
Furthermore, the alerts contain some contextual information which is the pathophysiological state of
the involved organ systems. This is different from normal medical alerts that signal the physiological
signals being out of a predefined range; such alerts are not closely coupled with best practice guidelines
and may be less useful or even distracting.
To evaluate the effectiveness of our alert system, we have conducted a preliminary clinical validation
of cardiac arrest guidance system in a Carle ACLS training class. In Section 3.4, we present the
information gathered and discuss some of the lessons learned. There is also a 2-part study protocol
with Carle hospital in place. These studies will assess how much improvement our cardiac arrest
guidance system can make in terms of adherence to ACLS workflow, compared to traditional approach
of memorizing workflows and, using paper and pencil for recording resuscitation events.
The primary contribution and focus of this thesis is addressing the above modeling and design chal-
lenges. However, our research also contributes to the following:
Best practice guided runtime device configuration: Medical systems need to inherently be run-
time configurable. In acute care environments, the patient condition can change rapidly and as a result
of such changes, new devices may be plugged in or an existing device may be removed from clinical
configuration. Such dynamic configuration is not seen in other monitoring systems. The safety and
efficacy of patient care in a dynamic clinical environment depend on continuously safe use of medi-
cal monitoring and therapeutic devices. In Chapter 6, we propose a device configuration management
approach that uses the organ-centric pathophysiology-based disease model and patient state representa-
tion. We show that a subset of best practice device configuration safety requirements can be described
as a device constraint which must be satisfied for specific organ states.
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Safety analysis of medical device plug-n-play (MD PnP) systems: MD PnP is a recent NIH
(National Institute of Health) sponsored investigation on design of safe integrated medical systems
[10]. One goal of this program is adoption of medical device interoperability to significantly mitigate
preventable medical errors by developing the technological foundation to design the next generation
medical systems. In Chapter 5, we provide guidelines to assist users to safely use an MD PnP system
consisting of a commercial platform not designed for safety critical applications. The MD PnP system
is said to be safe for an intended medical application, if none of the MD PnP components can become
a causal factor of the known safety hazards when the medical devices are functioning according to
their specifications. We propose a safety analysis procedure based on extended fault trees to determine
whether any of the MD PnP components can become a causal factor of the known safety hazards for
the intended medical scenario. We analyze the MD PnP safety for several clinical scenarios.
1.3 Related Work
The preventable medical errors are often caused by slips and lapses, which include, but are not
limited to delayed diagnosis, delayed or ineffective therapeutic interventions, and unintended deviation
from the best practice guidelines. Due to factors such as selective attention1, time pressure in acute
care, and mental overload, medical staff might overlook some of the critical changes in the patient state
and this may result in delayed diagnosis and treatment. Updating and displaying the set of monitoring
and treatment guidelines as the patient state changes may alleviate this problem.
Many of current medical monitoring devices and systems provide single (physiological) measurement-
alerts and thus little contextual information to medical staff. Some research has been done on exploiting
the relations between measurements and the development of smart alarms [12], [13]. However, we be-
lieve that an integrated computerized system is necessary to help medical staff keep track of critical
changes in patient state and perform treatments in a timely manner. In [14], the authors discusses
a task-driven guidance systems to reduce preventable medical errors in cardiac arrest resuscitation.
1Selective attention is simply the act of focusing on a particular object for a period of time, while simultaneously ignoring
irrelevant information that is also occurring [11]. For example, in a cardiac arrest case, physician can be focused on stimu-
lating the heart by administering medications such as epinephrine, while overlooking the fact that the patient is developing
renal insufficiency that can be exacerbated if the same heart stimulating drugs are administered with the same dosage.
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Treatment validation and workflow adaptation for changing patient state are studied in [15] and [16].
The authors in [17] and [18] provide a comparison study of several different computer-interpretable
guideline (CIG) models, including PRODIGY [19], EON [20], GLIF [21], GUIDE , PROforma [22]
and Asbru [23]. Each approach focuses on addressing a particular modeling challenge. The comparison
was made according to different dimensions that capture the structure of each model. One of the main
dimensions of comparison is representation and organization of guidelines. Most of these models
encode the guidelines as plans of decision and actions tasks and organized into task networks and
provide nesting mechanisms to simplify top-level plans and support the reuse of of sub-guidelines.
Another dimension is the decision model and criteria expression language. Some use switch constructs
or mutually exclusive expressions in preconditions. In some models argumentation rules are used
to express preferences for/against alternatives candidates of non-deterministic decisions (where more
than one alternative is considered appropriate). Decision trees and influence diagrams are also used
to represent non-deterministic choices to help identifying the alternative most likely to reach the goal.
Medical concepts are often modeled using classification hierarchies, definition of abstract terms and
concepts, and relationship between the concepts that convey medical knowledge. Concepts are often
defined through mapping to terminology systems.
The comparison dimension, which is of special interest to our work in this thesis is patient informa-
tion model. Often in these works, the main focus is on representation and modeling of guidelines rather
than the patient state. PRODIGY, EON, GLIF use a specific modeling component, called Scenario or
patient state components to facilitates a patient’s automatic entry into an appropriate plan. Other mod-
els use expressions of patient states and decision criteria or as preconditions affecting the control flow.
A presence criteria is modeled by giving explicit definitions of terms to be checked and determining a
method for looking for the terms in the local EMR. Plan selection is based on satisfying a precondition
defined in terms of patient state but it can be further improved by matching the effect of plan to target
state.
The patient information model in these guidelines systems, focuses on representing the patient data
and mapping it to the corresponding items in hospital EMR. This can limit the definition of patients
state to the terms used in the local EMR. The representation methodologies often organize relevant
information in a single structure. Some, such as PROforma, GUIDE and Asbru, do not put any con-
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straints on the definition of complex objects; others define a specific set of patient data structures and
complex objects. PRODIGY and EON use virtual medical record (VMR) abstraction to identify the
subset of patient data, from medical records, which is required for decision support applications. These
abstractions include diagnosis, test result, medication authorization, procedure, etc. An object-oriented
VMR would ease the process of developing guidelines. The criteria and patient states are defined in
guidelines by referencing the VMR rather than specific EMR data item.
GLIF structures the patient data according to HL7 reference information model (RIM) [24], [25].
Having a patient information model consistent with HL7-RMI could facilitates mapping guidelines
terms to EMRs and interoperability. HL7 Reference Information Model (RIM) is a key component of
the HL7 family of standards. It serves as the source from which all other HL7 information models
receive its meaning. RIM outlines the logical form of the data and allows establishing the semantic
interoperability among different domains in healthcare. It is ”an abstract model which defines the
grammar of a language for information in healthcare”. The ”entities” are related to each other through
”roles” and their participations in ”acts”. The model allows the formation of networks of logically
or structurally related ”acts”. Through these networks, composition, reason, order fulfillment can be
expressed. The HL7-RIM does not define disease processes, which is among the ultimate subject of
health information.
However, mapping guidelines data items to EMRs can still be defined by a system, even if the
representation of patient state does not come from the classes and abstracts supported by EMRs, which
is mostly based on HL7-RIM. Our organ-centric models may create monitoring and treatment guideline
data items, which do not correspond to any specific items in EMRs. However, the subset that has
corresponding data items can be mapped. We have integrated the organ-centric pathophysiological
models and best practice guidelines models into a guidance system. Our team has started developing
an HL7 module for the guidance system that defines the mapping of monitoring and guideline terms
codified by our models.
Some of these approaches, specifically the ones using the concept of scenarios, organize the guide-
lines as a collection if clinical contexts, which are (partial) characterization of patient state. The other
approaches support a similar functionality by using expressions that refer to patient states in decision
criteria or preconditions to affect the guideline control flow. Some argue the latter approach allows
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guideline modeling to remain task-based, rather than state-based. However, clinical scenarios are in-
tuitive and domain expert find them useful. We believe that our pathophysiology-based patient model
belongs to the group of state-based approaches. Physicians are taught body organ systems and struc-
tural relationships within the body. Moreover, the pathophysiological description of disease processes
is how medical knowledge is commonly known by the physicians [6, 7]. Therefore, the developed
models would be at the same abstraction level that medical knowledge and reasoning are known to
physicians. This can make clinical validation easier and more effective. Physicians may directly look
at the organ models and cross reference with the requirements. However, we still can support the use
of patient-state based decision criteria and preconditions.
A great body of work in this domain has been focused on rule-based systems and expert systems
developed using artificial intelligence. These systems are designed to provide medical diagnosis and
treatment suggestions by codifying experts’ knowledge, reasoning using the rules and deducing new
knowledge [26]. Several inference and decision making methodologies have been developed, such as
rule-based reasoning [27], fuzzy logic [28] and probabilistic network [29]. Approaches based on ma-
chine learning aim to excerpt common patterns from empirical medical data and make decisions based
on the learned behaviors [30]. In [31], a modular representation is proposed, where each guideline is
modeled as a Medical Logic Module (MLM) that makes a single decision. This approach focuses on
simple independent guidelines. However, most clinical problems are complicated and involve many
dynamic decision-making steps; therefore, straightforward attempts to chain together larger sets of
rules encounter major difficulties [32]. Furthermore, the medical knowledge are often represented as a
set of production rules. Any potential dependency between the rule can not represented and a plan of
monitoring or treatment actions unfolding over time can not be represented with individual rules.
Our computational approach codifies patient information into executable organ automata.The main
reason behind developing organ-centric disease models is that medical literature and training represent
disease as a set of abnormal organ states. There have been similar works on organization of patient in-
formation. The authors in [33] propose a framework of open-source services dynamically configurable
to transform EHR data into standards-conforming, comparable information suitable for large-scale
analyses, inferencing, and integration of disparate health data. In [34] a new application system is pro-
posed to store and categorize patient information according to body system view. However, the focus
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of these works have been on static information structures and not monitoring rapidly changing patient
state. We focus on developing executable disease models that can be directly used to derive the best
practice assist system.
In [35], the authors propose a method for medical knowledge representation based on causal asso-
ciational network. Different observations of the patient is associated with pathophysiological states
describing the progress of the disease under study. The relationship ship between different pathophys-
iological states are represented using the notion of cause and effect. The links between the states are
annotated with a likelihood number indicating the strength of causation. It should be noted that the
states are not mutually exclusive. The proposed approach, in fact, models the disease as a belief net-
work that is used to analyze the possible causes of an already confirmed diagnosis. At the start, the set
of confirmed pathophysiological states representing the patient current disease are identified. Then they
determine the most likely starting states, from which most likely pathways are generated that traverse
through the greatest number of confirmed states. The generated pathways represent the most likely
explanations of the disease processes. The physician then uses these pathways to classify the disease
based on its mechanism and the severity and the degree of progression. A treatment plan can be asso-
ciated with each diagnosis class. In our proposed approach, we dynamically track the state of different
pathophysiological processes. Furthermore, we take a more modular approach and model the parallel
pathophysiological processes using concurrent state machines. Our executable models are then used to
monitor the patient and concurrent changes occurring as a result of the disease. Maintaining a large be-
lief network can become challenging. Furthermore, developing the model for a more complex disease
involving a larger number of pathophysiological states can be non-trivial. Even making modification to
the same disease model may require propagating the changes throughout the whole model. The modu-
larity becomes critical when the model needs to be modified, validated or formally verified. Moreover,
in our approach some of the pathophysiological processes can be re-used in different disease.
Another body of work has been focused on formally defining medical processes. The documents
describing different medical protocols used to administer healthcare, may be incomplete and include
terms are either poorly defined or used inconsistently throughout the document. Moreover, important
details, specifically the ones related to handling exceptional cases, might be missing. The use of such
defective processes for providing health care services can contribute to medical errors that ultimately
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affect patient safety. The authors in [36, 37] focus on tackling this problem by proposing an approach
to formally define medical processes. The authors use Little-JIL process definition language to specify
different recommended sequence of actions to perform a specific clinical task. The precisely defined
model of medical processes, can then be used for rigorous analysis.
Little-JIL originally developed to define processes that coordinates the activities of multiple agents
[38]. The main component of the language is the coordination specification, which has a graphical
representation but also its syntax and semantic are precisely defined. The central abstraction in the
language is the step and facilities for specifying iteration and concurrency is included in the language.
We believe the authors use a task-based modeling approach, similar to the guidelines model discussed
above. The analysis of formally-defined human-intensive medical processes is further discussed in
[39, 40]. The paper describes using finite state verification to find defects in the process definition or
the medical processes itself. This is achieved by determining if the specified properties are always
satisfied on all possible execution paths through the process definition; but it is assumed that all agents
involved in the process perform their tasks without error. The authors have built tools to automatically
translate Little-JIL process definition to the input representation of verification tools such as SPIN [41].
Each property is represented as a finite-state automaton that describes the acceptable or unacceptable
sequence of selected events in the process being analyzed. Human-intensive medical processes, such
as blood transfusion and chemotherapy, are used to demonstrate the value of the proposed approach.
Several errors, including possible deadlock, was discovered in these processes.
In [42] the use of other static analysis technologies, such as Failure Modes & Effects Analysis
(FMEA) [43], and Fault Tree Analysis (FTA) [44, 45] for medical process improvement is discussed.
The authors apply FMEA to formally defined processes to evaluate the impact of individual step failures
on the whole process. This technique can demonstrate the propagation of a single failure and the
ultimate effect which often indicate a safety hazard directly and explicitly violating patient safety. FTA
analysis can also be used to study all the failure modes leading to a specific safety hazard. In addition to
static process analysis, the authors also discuss the simulation technique that uses the dynamic process
execution state, specifications of the behaviors and capabilities of agents, and a resource model .The
technique is used to study a different range of problems, such as effect of resource (i.e. the doctors,
nurses, and beds) allocation on the length of patient stay.
14
The formal process models proposed in [39] is also used in [46] for online deviation detection in
medical processes. The main goal in this work is to reduce medical errors by encouraging confor-
mance with best practice guidelines and recommended processes. The authors adopt the definition of
medical errors from the IOM report [2] and focus on ”error of planning”, which is the use of wrong
plan to achieve a goal (vs. error of execution, which is the failure of a planned task to be performed as
intended). Examples of planning errors are omitting a required task or performing a task that should
not have been done. In the proposed approach, process execution is tracked and the sequence of per-
formed steps is continually compared with all the valid and recommended sequence of steps to detect
deviations. After the detection phase trace selection is used to hypothesize the locations of potential
errors. A set of chosen traces are likely candidates the process performer had intended to carry out
and are more similar to the deviant. The difference between each selected trace and the deviant then
can be used to pinpoint the location of the potential error in the sequence of performed steps in the
corresponding medical process. It should be noted that delayed deviant detection might occur. A pre-
liminary analysis is presented but, as discussed by the authors, this issue needs to be investigated for
more complex and realistic medical processes. The scalability and applicability of this approach need
to be also studied for more realistic scenarios then the one described and used in this paper. The steps
need to be logged manually by the human operators until the technology for automatic recognition
and recording of different steps of a medical process as they are accomplished. Similarly, in our pro-
posed physician model we also assume the physician response to the system-suggested guidelines to
be manually entered into the system. However, the (monitoring and treatment) steps in our model are
more coarse grained compared to the steps described in these human-intensive processes model. This
reduces the number of interactions required between the system and medical staff.
In [47], the authors present a conceptual architecture and the necessary system components for
aiding the effective execution of human-intensive medical processes. [48] further describes how the
formally-defined and previously analyzed processes can be used to create context-based checklists to
improve the outcomes in human-intensive healthcare systems. In addition to a process model, the
proposed Smart Checklist Generator also uses a the events generated by a process execution monitor.
The checklist is continuously updated as the health care personnel go through the different steps of
the process. Some examples of events of interest are the completion of a subtask, occurrence of an
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exception during the process execution or receipt of a patient data sent by medical devices or entered
manually. A visualization is provided for different aspects of the current execution of the process.
This includes the tasks that have been successfully performed, the current tasks being executed and
the possible future steps. Each of these items in the smart checklist can be annotated with necessary
and important information, such as needed artifacts, the performers responsible for finishing the task
and possible exception that can occur when performing the task. We also believe the use of context
information to dynamically adapt the checklist can improve the efficiency these checks. Moreover, it
can alleviate the problems caused by long, complex and generic checklists.
The focus of this body of work is on human-intensive clinical protocols used for providing different
healthcare services. The proposed medical process modeling approach is mostly used for offline static
analysis of medical processes. Only preliminary work on the realtime use of formally defined med-
ical processes to derive the execution of guidance systems has been proposed. Real-time constraints
are a critical aspect of any medical system. However, Little-JIL provides little and primitive support
for timing constructs. This makes the specification and analysis of both hard and soft real-time con-
straints challenging. Furthermore, maintaining and updating process models for more complex clinical
protocols can be challenging and a more modular representation may be beneficial. Finally, medical
knowledge representation regarding patient state is not discussed in these works. However, we can use
and benefit from the proposed approach if we decide to further focus on the coordination aspect of
the human-intensive processes used to deliver treatments from best practice guidelines. This includes
management of interaction of health care providers with each other and with the patient.
The clinical guidance systems must integrate clinical data form different sources, mainly medical
devices. Therefore, interoperability of medical devices is critical for designing the system [49]. The
recent investigation sponsored by National Institute of Health (NIH) on safe medical system reconfig-
uration and interoperability, Medical Device Plug-and-Play (MD PnP) [10], focuses on developing the
technological foundation to design the next generation medical systems. The Integrated Clinical En-
vironment (ICE) standard is one such development, which is described in ASTM 2761-09(2013) [50].
This standard describes the logical elements of an MD PnP system but does not specify implementation
details. The MD PnP system supports a range of safe medical system reconfigurations. The medical
devices are plugged in as needed, information from different sources are integrated, and medical ac-
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tions are coordinated to provide an integrated clinical environment. To facilitate the development of
medical device interoperability, the MD PnP program has developed an open source implementation
of the Integrated Clinical Environment and made it freely available on SourceForge [51]. The platform
consists of software device adapters for medical devices (including anesthesia machines, ventilators,
and patient monitors), Object Management Group (OMG) Data Distribution Service for Real-Time
systems (DDS) standard middle-ware, and demonstration applications.
The necessity of proper infrastructures and the principles of medical platforms have also been dis-
cussed in [52, 53]. Advanced monitoring systems, such as the proposed assist system in this thesis,
can benefit from the technological foundations such as MD PnP framework and built upon it. There
are several works, which have also studied medical device interoperability to improve patient safety. In
[54], the authors discuss a low complexity coordination architecture for networked supervisory medi-
cal systems. In [55, 56], a coordination framework is introduced to facilitates integration of different
medical devices, and provide a model-based app programming environment for easy assembling of a
new medical application . In [57] the authors report their experience with a prototype plug-and-play
synchronized medical system including an x-ray and a ventilator. An interoperable medical system in-
cluding a patient controlled analgesia (PCA) pump is the focus in [58, 59]. While these works focused
on a static configuration, our focus has been on a more generic scheme to ensure patient safety in the
more dynamic configuration of acute care.
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Chapter 2
Organ-Centric Pathophysiology-Based
Modeling Paradigm
A main prerequisite for developing a guideline system is creating computer interpretable representa-
tions of he clinical knowledge contained in best practice guidelines. In other words, creation of such
systems requires considerable amount of modeling activity such as deciding what patient data is rele-
vant and identifying the concept and relationships among concepts that relate to guideline generations
[5]. The main focus of this thesis is on developing executable clinical models for acute care.
We propose an organ-centric pathophysiology-based modeling paradigm, where we translate the
medical text into executable interactive disease and organ models. We model the patient state and
different disease stages according to pathophysiology of organ systems, which describes how each of
the organ functions are affected by the disease. As mentioned before, such clinical models are studied
extensively in medical community. However, the common format used to represent and communicate
clinical knowledge, including such models, is English (text and graphics). Therefore, utilizing these
models when providing clinical care can be as challenging as using a map while driving. Turning
maps to GPS based navigation tools has revolutionized driving. Translating pathophysiological models,
based in medical best practice text, into executable models can have a similar effect on the use of
computer guidance systems in medicine.
However, there are several challenges for developing executable clinical models that must be ad-
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dressed. In the rest of this chapter, we first discuss these modeling challenges in Section 2.1. Next, we
describe how we address each challenge by proposing an organ-centric pathophysiology-based model-
ing paradigm and introducing a set of modeling guidelines in Sections 2.2 and 2.3, respectively. The
next step is applying the guidelines to construct he organ-centric pathophysiological models. However,
the description of this step is postponed to Chapters 3 and 4, when we discuss our two cases studies
in more detail. We believe the model construction procedure can be described by case studies more
clearly and effectively. We discuss the general approach we have taken to formally verify the model’s
safety properties in Section 2.5. We present a model driven approach for integrating the models into a
guidance system in Section 2.6. Finally, the clinical validation of the models are discussed in Section
2.7.
2.1 Modeling Challenges
In Chapter 1, we presented a list of the modeling challenges we have identified in this thesis. In this
section, we present these challenges in greater details. We refer to ith modeling challenge asMCHi:
MCH1: Medical knowledge representation must be in a machine-processable form. The med-
ical knowledge must be translated from text format to a structure appropriate for the logical applica-
tion of that knowledge by a computer guidance system. The developed clinical model(s) should be
executable or must provide a means for automatic execution to facilitate the design of best practice
guidance systems.
MCH2: The developed models must encode the relevant clinical information. The model needs
to encode the medical information or knowledge relevant to the disease under study. For example,
a physician often is interested in not only diagnosis itself but also the process of diagnosis and the
clinical data required to make a diagnosis. However, the encoded information must be adequate but not
excessive such that it create a mental overload.
MCH3: The medical knowledge representation and other encoded clinical knowledge must
be easily understood and validated. Physicians can play a critical role in development and validation
of executable clinical models. Therefore, models must encode the relevant medical knowledge at the
same abstraction level that medical knowledge and reasoning are known to medical domain experts.
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MCH4: The modeling paradigm must be applicable to different diseases in acute care. The
medical knowledge representation and modeling methodology must be able to model different diseases
in acute care. Initially, we have used the cardiac arrest case study when developing our model. How-
ever, to evaluate the applicability of our proposed modeling paradigm, different diseases or acute care
scenarios must be considered.
MCH5: The correct level of abstraction must be chosen for each model. Some clinical in-
formation, although relevant, may not be needed in the same details as others. Therefore, to develop
efficient and effective models, we must identify the correct level of abstraction for different modeling
components.
MCH6: The model must have the correct level of concurrency. The model may need to repre-
sent dynamic clinical information and may be used to track different aspects of patient state that may
change simultaneously. Therefore, the model must be designed in a such way that it would be able to
concurrently track all the critical changes.
MCH7: The model complexity must be managed. While encoding all the relevant information,
the model must remain manageable. This is critical since development and modification of highly com-
plex models can be error-prone. Furthermore, the formal verification task may grow more challenging
as the model complexity increases. This becomes specifically useful when modeling complex diseases
involving high number of pathophysiological processes.
In the next section, we present our organ-centric pathophysiology-based paradigm and specify the
subset of modeling challenges addressed by the proposed paradigm. We address the remaining ones by
introducing a set of modeling guidelines, later in the chapter.
2.2 Modeling Paradigm
We propose an organ-centric pathophysiology-based modeling paradigm, where patient state is mod-
eled according to pathophysiology of affected organ systems. This is possible because disease and
organ states are already discretized by the medical community; for example, different stages of cancer,
diabetes, heart diseases, etc. Furthermore, the diagnosis and treatment are organized for each stage.
Different diseases may impair one or more of the physiological functions performed by different
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organ systems. Pathophysiology describes the process of such changes in physiological measurements
and organ states throughout the disease progress. Multiple pathophysiological processes must often be
tracked for each disease. Therefore, an executable organ-centric pathophysiology-based model would
encode the key clinical information relevant to the disease under study. This partially addresses the
modeling challenge MCH2. However, additional considerations are required when designing the
specific modeling components to address this challenge more efficiently. We further discuss this when
presenting our modeling guidelines in Section 2.3. The following summarizes the main reasons behind
developing our models according to this paradigm:
• Physicians are taught body organ systems and structural relationships within the body. Moreover,
the pathophysiological description of disease processes is how medical knowledge is commonly
known by the physicians [6, 7]. The developed models would be at the same abstraction level that
medical knowledge and reasoning are known to physicians. They may directly look at the or-
gan models and cross reference with the requirements. Consequently, choosing an organ-centric
pathophysiology-based paradigm to represent patient and disease state can make clinical valida-
tion easier and more effective. In other words, the proposed modeling paradigm can address the
challengeMCH3.
• Multiple organ systems may be affected by a disease and the interaction among different organ
systems, and monitoring and therapeutic actions make the dynamics very difficult for physicians
to follow. Therefore, computational methods that collect, organize, and process patient informa-
tion according to organ-based pathophysiological models and presents them in a timely manner
can serve physicians in the best way possible.
• Physicians often describe monitoring and therapeutic requirements for different organ states.
For example, ACLS algorithm indicates that shock must be considered when shockable rhythm
is confirmed. This is a treatment guideline for arrhythmia, which is an insufficiency of car-
diovascular organ system. Therefore, the proposed modeling paradigm could also facilitate the
design of any clinical guidance system that encodes the best practice monitoring and treatment
guidelines.
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To develop our models, we use finite state machine formalism. We model a disease according to
the pathophysiology of involved organ systems, which describes how each of the organ functions are
affected by the disease. Each state machine, which is a labeled transition system, models one such
process. The nodes represent different pathophysiological states. The state variables may include
physiological measurements and lab values. The definition of each state and the condition enabling
transitions between the states are extracted from medical literature and clinical best practice guidelines.
These models have formal semantics and are executable. Therefore, they can be used to track disease
progress, organ state deteriorations, and organ state improvements, etc. This addresses the challenge
MCH1. We use an open-source tool, called Yakindu, for developing and simulating he state machines
and integrating them into a guidance system. The details on model integration are discussed in Section
2.6.
We presented a brief description of cardiac arrest in Section 1.1. This disease mainly affects the
cardiovascular organ system. The heart rhythm may change and include abnormal or irregular heart
rhythms or waveforms (arrhythmias). Furthermore, The insufficient blood circulation in the lungs
impedes the CO2 and O2 exchange resulting in CO2 accumulation in the blood, which may be related
to a rise in blood acidity level indicated by decrease in blood pH level. The abnormal pH is revealed in
arterial blood gas (ABG) test. These are two examples of pathophysiological changes in cardiovascular
organ system caused by the disease.
A simplified cardiac arrest model was presented in Figure 1.1. We have developed the arrhythmia
and blood gas imbalance automata among others. In each of these automata we codify different stages/-
types of heart rhythm irregularity or imbalance in arterial blood gas levels according to existing medical
knowledge. Fo example, pulseless electrical activity, a heart rhythm observed on the electrocardiogram
that should be producing a pulse, but is not, is a state in the arrhythmia automata. Similarly, severe
metabolic acidosis, a very low blood pH , is a state in blood gas imbalance automata. When new blood
pressure, heart rate, and EKG readings are received by our best practice system and blood pH value
from a recent ABG test is entered by the nurse, the arrhythmia and blood gas imbalance automata will
transition to the appropriate states. Let us assume the current readings indicate a very low blood pres-
sure and blood pH , no meaningful heart rate reading and an EKG rhythm that is not a flat line but does
not produce a pulse. Therefore, the arrhythmia machine transitions to pulseless electrical activity state
22
G1:$All$the$relevant$pathophysiological$processes$for$the$disease$under$study$
must$be$modeled.
G2:"The"information"that"is"important,"but"not"needed"in"the"same"detail"as"
others,"must"be"aggregated.
G3:"The"affected"physiological"functions"that"need"to"be"tracked"simultaneously"
must"be"modeled"by"concurrent$state$machines.
G4:"The"states"defined"for"each"pathophysiological"state"machine"must"clinically"
sound"and"actionable
G5:"The"correct"and"optimal$number$of$transitions$must"be"identified"by"
considering"the"underlying"medical"knowledge"
G6:"The"interaction between"the"pathophysiological"state"machines"must"be"
minimized"and"for"the"necessary"interactions"the"interface"must"be"well<defined.
Figure 2.1: The List of Modeling Guidelines
and blood gas imbalance transitions to severe metabolic acidosis. We present a more detailed cardiac
arrest model after presenting our modeling guidelines.
The use of organ-centric pathophysiology-based paradigm and finite state machine formalism to de-
velop our models, only addresses MCH1and partially addresses MCH2 and MCH3. In the next
section we introduce a set of modeling guidelines to further address MCH2 and MCH3 and chal-
lengesMCH5 -MCH7. We partially address the final remaining challengeMCH4, that is applica-
bility of the proposed modeling paradigm to different diseases in acute care, by applying the paradigm
and guidelines to construct the sepsis model. In comparison to cardiac arrest, this is a more complex
case study an involves more pathophysiological processes.
2.3 Modeling Guidelines
In this section we present the modeling guidelines we have developed to specifically address the
challenges MCH5 - MCH7. We describe each guideline and explain the challenges it addresses.
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Figure 2.1 shows the list of these guideline. Note that there is a many-to-many relationship between the
identified modeling challenges and proposed guidelines. An illustrative summary of this relationship is
provided at the end of this section. The modeling guidelines are as follows; we refer to ith guideline
asGi:
G1: All the relevant pathophysiological processes for the disease under studymust be modeled.
As mentioned in the previous section, each disease can cause several abnormalities and insufficiencies
in different organ systems. For example, in cardiac arrest, the main affected organ is the cardiovascular
system. The effect mainly includes abnormal heart rhythm and blood acidity and gas levels. However,
other organs might also be affected by cardiac arrest. For example, while medical staff focus on treating
arrhythmia and injecting various drugs, such as epinephrine, patient may develop renal insufficiency.
If the medical staff do not notice the new condition and continue giving the same drugs with the same
dosage, patient’s kidney may become severely insufficient or even fail. Therefore, we must include
all the organ and insufficiency category models relevant to the disease under study. In other words, a
pathophysiological process becomes relevant if the corresponding physiological function is affected by
the disease and/or affects the treatment plan.
The relevant pathophysiological processes would be used to track the disease progress, patient’s
response to treatments or adapt the treatment plans. For cardiac arrest, in addition to arrhythmia and
blood gas imbalance state machines, our model also includes a renal insufficiency state machine to
demonstrate the multi-organ interactions. Note that identifying these pathophysiological processes is
guided by existing medical knowledge and best practice text. This guideline further addressesMCH2,
that is identifying the relevant clinical information to be encoded in the model. The next few guidelines
help us determine what information to encode in each pathophysiological process and how to model
them using finite state formalism.
G2: The information that is important, but not needed in the same detail as others, must
be aggregated. This is also determined by pathophysiology of the disease under study. Different
pathophysiological functions of the main affected organ system(s) are often monitored individually
and in great detail. In addition, more measurements are used to assess each of these pathophysiological
functions, compared to the other organs. The choice of clinical measurements to encode in each patho-
physiological state machine is derived from the best practice guidelines for the disease in cooperation
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with the physicians.
For example, in the case of cardiac arrest, most guidelines focus on cardiovascular system as the
main affected organ. Therefore, more detailed information regarding cardiovascular abnormalities such
as arrhythmia, blood gas imbalance and etc. may be codified in the model. On the other hand, the
medical information regarding the pathophysiology of kidney organ system are aggregated as degree
of renal insufficiency. This guideline aims at addressingMCH5, that is choosing the correct level of
abstractions for each model component.
G3: The affected physiological functions that need to be tracked simultaneously must be mod-
eled by separate finite state machines. If the modeling guideline G2, has been already applied, fol-
lowing this one becomes straightforward. Previously we have specified different (aggregated) patho-
physiological processes that need to be tracked. These processes are often occur simultaneously in
patient’s body. To keep track of all these states and prevent any critical changes from being overlooked,
we model each process using a separate state machine.
Figure 2.2 shows the concurrent states machines developed for each of our case studies. Each ma-
chine encodes and tracks one of the simultaneous insufficiencies caused by the corresponding disease.
Th details on sepsis model will be provided in Chapter 4. This guideline addresses MCH6, that is
determining the correct level of concurrency for the model.
The next three guidelines are introduced to address the modeling challengeMCH7, that is manag-
ing the model complexity.
G4: The states defined for each pathophysiological state machine must clinically sound and
actionable. The previous guideline has helped us identify the concurrent state machines that needs to
be developed. The next step is to define the states for each pathophysiological state machine. Each
state is defined by correlating relevant physiological measurements and clinical data. The choice of
state variables are guided by medical literature and/or given by our physician collaborators. 1
However, defining a large number of states for each machine can make the model very complex and
unmanageable. Moreover, not all the changes in physiological measurements are relevant or useful
for a given disease. Providing too much information and too many alerts to medical staff may create
1There are measurements, which physicians often look at as a group and interpret together to have a better assessment of
patient state.
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Figure 2.2: Concurrent Pathophysiological State Machines for Cardiac Arrest and Sepsis Models
confusion and increase their mental overload, which is what our system aims to prevent in the first
place. Therefore, we have used the notion of actionable states. We define a new state when there is a
need for a new monitoring or therapeutic plan. The actionable states can be extracted from best practice
or the clinical requirements specified by physician.
Figure 2.3 shows a simplified respiratory insufficiency state machine demonstrating how this guide-
line can be applied. The states in this machine represent different degrees of respiratory insufficiency
and critical change in patient’s respiratory state that require an action from medical staff. For exam-
ple, the setting for ventilation therapy must be adapted when patient transitions to a new state. The
transitions indicating organ state improvement are not displayed for better readability.
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Figure 2.3: Actionable States in Respiratory Insufficiency State Machine
In addition toMCH7, this guideline also helps further address the modeling challengesMCH3 and
MCH4. The pathophysiological models with smaller number of states can be more easily understood
and validated. Furthermore, the notion of actionable state helps with identifying the relevant changes
in patient state that needs to be encoded in the model.
G5: The correct and optimal number of transitions must be identified by considering the
underlying medical knowledge. Similar to the definition of states in each machine, defining a large
number of transitions can make the model complex and less understandable. Moreover, the process of
model development becomes more error prone. The key in identifying the correct and optimal number
of transitions is considering the medical knowledge underlying our models.
The required transitions can be extracted from the pathophysiological process being modeled by the
state machine. Development and resolution of organ failure may take some time. Therefore, when
continuous physiological variables are used to define different insufficiency states, we may not need
to create an edge between every insufficiency states. The transitions are only defined to represent the
progress of insufficiency. The exception may be the initial state; since we do not know the patient state
when we start, we can define a transition between the initial state and every other insufficiency states.
This can remove any potential latency in patient state tracking associated with the model stabilization.
If we do not have the transition edges from the initial state, when the system starts the models might
need a few cycles to stabilize and reflect the current patient state. However, when discrete measurement,
such as EKG rhythm, are used to define different states we may require to define transition between all
insufficiency states. Figure 2.4 shows renal insufficiency and arrhythmia state machine. The transitions
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A Need for Sepsis Definitions for the Public
and for Health Care Practitioners
Despite its worldwide importance,6,7 public awareness of sepsis is
poor.29 Furthermore, the variousmanifestations of sepsismake di-
agnosis difficult, even for experienced clinicians. Thus, the public
needs an understandable definition of sepsis, whereas health care
practitioners require improved clinical prompts and diagnostic ap-
proaches to facilitate earlier identification and an accurate quanti-
fication of the burden of sepsis.
Results/Recommendations
Definition of Sepsis
Sepsis is defined as life-threatening organ dysfunction caused by a
dysregulated host response to infection (Box 3). This new defini-
tion emphasizes theprimacyof thenonhomeostatic host response
to infection, the potential lethality that is considerably in excess of
a straightforward infection, and theneed for urgent recognition.As
described later, even a modest degree of organ dysfunction when
infection is first suspected is associatedwith an in-hospital mortal-
ity in excess of 10%. Recognition of this condition thus merits a
prompt and appropriate response.
NonspecificSIRScriteria suchaspyrexiaorneutrophiliawill con-
tinue to aid in the general diagnosis of infection. These findings
complement features of specific infections (eg, rash, lung consoli-
dation,dysuria,peritonitis) that focusattentiontowardthe likelyana-
tomical source and infecting organism. However, SIRS may simply
reflectanappropriatehost responsethat is frequentlyadaptive.Sep-
sis involvesorgandysfunction, indicatingapathobiologymorecom-
plex than infection plus an accompanying inflammatory response
alone. The task force emphasis on life-threatening organ dysfunc-
tion is consistentwith the view that cellular defects underlie physi-
ologic and biochemical abnormalities within specific organ sys-
tems.Under this terminology, “severesepsis”becomessuperfluous.
Sepsis shouldgenerallywarrant greater levels ofmonitoring and in-
tervention, including possible admission to critical care or high-
dependency facilities.
Clinical Criteria to Identify PatientsWith Sepsis
The task force recognized that no current clinical measures reflect
the concept of a dysregulated host response. However, as noted
by the 2001 task force, many bedside examination findings and
routine laboratory test results are indicative of inflammation or
organ dysfunction.10 The task force therefore evaluated which
clinical criteria best identified infected patients most likely to
have sepsis. This objective was achieved by interrogating large
data sets of hospitalized patients with presumed infection,
assessing agreement among existing scores of inflammation
(SIRS)9 or organ dysfunction (eg, SOFA,27,28 Logistic Organ
Dysfunction System30) (construct validity), and delineating their
correlation with subsequent outcomes (predictive validity). In
addition, multivariable regression was used to explore the perfor-
mance of 21 bedside and laboratory criteria proposed by the 2001
task force.10
Full details are found in the accompanying article by Seymour
et al.12 In brief, electronic health record data of 1.3 million encoun-
ters at 12 community and academic hospitals within the Univer-
sity of Pittsburgh Medical Center health system in southwestern
Pennsylvania were studied. There were 148 907 patients with
suspected infection, identified as those who had body fluids
sampled for culture and received antibiotics. Two outcomes—
hospital mortality and mortality, ICU stay of 3 days or longer, or
both—were used to assess predictive validity both overall and
across deciles of baseline risk as determined by age, sex, and
comorbidity. For infected patients both inside and outside of the
Table 1. Sequential [Sepsis-Related] Organ Failure Assessment Scorea
System
Score
0 1 2 3 4
Respiration
PaO2/FIO2, mm Hg
(kPa)
≥400 (53.3) <400 (53.3) <300 (40) <200 (26.7) with
respiratory support
<100 (13.3) with
respiratory support
Coagulation
Platelets, ×103/μL ≥150 <150 <100 <50 <20
Liver
Bilirubin, mg/dL
(μmol/L)
<1.2 (20) 1.2-1.9 (20-32) 2.0-5.9 (33-101) 6.0-11.9 (102-204) >12.0 (204)
Cardiovascular MAP ≥70mmHg MAP <70mmHg Dopamine <5 or
dobutamine (any dose)b
Dopamine 5.1-15
or epinephrine ≤0.1
or norepinephrine ≤0.1b
Dopamine >15 or
epinephrine >0.1
or norepinephrine >0.1b
Central nervous system
Glasgow Coma Scale
scorec
15 13-14 10-12 6-9 <6
Renal
Creatinine, mg/dL
(μmol/L)
<1.2 (110) 1.2-1.9 (110-170) 2.0-3.4 (171-299) 3.5-4.9 (300-440) >5.0 (440)
Urine output, mL/d <500 <200
Abbreviations: FIO2, fraction of inspired oxygen; MAP, mean arterial pressure;
PaO2, partial pressure of oxygen.
a Adapted from Vincent et al.27
bCatecholamine doses are given as μg/kg/min for at least 1 hour.
c Glasgow Coma Scale scores range from 3-15; higher score indicates better
neurological function.
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Figure 2.4: Pathophysiological State Machines with (a) Continuous State Variables and (b) Discrete and
Continuous St te Variables
are defined following this guideline. In Renal m chine the tr nsitions ar o ly defined to r present the
progress of insufficiency, with the exception of initial state.
Transitions are annotated with guards expressing the physiological condition that indicates the des-
tination insufficiency state and only that state. The definition of states in each pathophysiological
processes may not be mutually exclusive, according to guidelines they are extracted from. This oc-
curs when a different set of physiological measurements are used to define these states. However, to
make the model behavior deterministic we ensure that the guards on all outgoing transitions from the
corresponding state are mutually exclusive. 2.4
This improve model understandability and makes clinical validation more efficient and therefore
helps address the modeling challenge MCH3. Figure 2.4 shows the mutually exclusive outgoing
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Figure 2.5: Interaction Diagram for Sepsis Model
transitions we have defines for each renal insufficiency state. Note that the definition of states, which
are extracted from SOFA 2 table, are not explicitly mutual exclusive [60]. The transitions indicating
renal organ state improvement are not displayed for better readability.
G5: The interaction between pathophysiological state machines must be minimized and for
necessary interactions the interface must be well-defined. Any potential interaction between differ-
ent state machines can be encoded in a central disease state machine. Figure 2.5 shows the interaction
diagram for the sepsis model. The interaction with best practice guideline and physician models will
be discussed later.
We try to minimize any communication or dependency between the pathophysiological machines.
This improves the model modularity. The complexity of validation and verification may be reduced
since most of pathophysiological state machines can be validated and verified independently of the oth-
ers. Lower interaction complexity also results in models that can be more easily understood. Therefore,
in addition toMCH7, this guideline partially addresses the modeling challengeMCH3 as well.
In this section, we discussed a set of modeling guidelines and the challenges addressed by each
one. As mentioned above, some of the challenges may be addressed by multiple guidelines. In Figure
2Sequential Organ Failure Assessment
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Figure 2.6: Summary of Modeling Challenges and Guidelines
2.6, we show this many-to-many relationship between the identified modeling challenges and proposed
modeling guidelines.
2.4 Additional Model Components
In addition to the modeling challenges, we presented additional design challenges in Chapter 1. In
this section we specifically focus on the following:
• Challenge 4: Physicians deviation from best practice guidelines must be tracked and recorded
• Challenge 6: An alarm management approach is required to reduce slips and lapse caused
by inadequate alarm configuration and practices
The role of human in the medical system can be more critical compared to most of other cyber-
physical human systems (CPHS). Moreover, the complexity and uncertainty of medicine sometimes
makes definitive decisions difficult. Therefore, it is critical to account for the human (specifically,
physician) as an important aspect of the system. In Section 2.4.1, we propose a compositional model
and a protocol to record and track physician response to the information provided by our model (sys-
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tem). In Section 2.4.2, as part of our guideline model, we present an alarm approach, which is integrated
with pathophysiological states.
Pseudocode 1 Convergence-Divergence Protocol
1 input 1: OrganAutomata OA = (OA1, OA2, . . . , OAn)
2 input 2: PhysicianAutomata PA = (PA1, PA2, . . . , PAn)
3 input 3: PatientState S = (S1, S2, . . . , Sn), input 4: PhysicianBelief B = (B1, B2, . . . , Bn)
4 input 5: BestPracticeGuidelines G, input 6,7: Short Timer Tshort, Long Timer Tlong
5 UPDATE();
6 if S 6= B
7 Send 1st Divergence Alert
8 DeviationCounter ++
9 Wait for Tshort
10 PrevS = S; PrevB = B
11 UPDATE();
12 if (PrevS == S && PrevB == B)
13 Send 2st Divergence Alert
14 DeviationCounter ++
15 else Gotoline9;
16 end if;
17 Wait for Tlong
18 PrevS = S; PrevB = B
19 UPDATE();
20 if (PrevS == S && PrevB == B)
21 Send Final Divergence
22 DeviationCounter ++ Alert
23 else Gotoline9;
24 end if;
25 elseDeviationCounter = 0
26 Display G0 ✓ G for the current patient state
27 S = (S1, S2, . . . , Sn)
28 end if
29 UPDATE() {
30 for i = 1 to n
31 Si = CurrentState(OAi)
32 Bi = CurrentState(PAi)
33 end for
34 S = (S1, S2, . . . , Sn)
35 B = (B1, B2, . . . , Bn) }
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Figure 2.7: Arrhythmia State Machine and its Corresponding Physician Belief Machine
2.4.1 Physician Model
At times patient states presented by our system may differ from physician understanding and they
may deviate from the best practice guidelines suggested by our system. A source of this inconsistency,
should it occur, is that there may be information used by the physician to make a determination but not
available to our system, or the inconsistency can be the result of unintended deviation. The physician
my override the best practice guidelines at anytime. However, any deviations from the best practice
guidelines should be tracked and recorded for offline analysis.
Physician Belief State Machine: We propose a compositional model to handle and track the physi-
cian interaction with the system. For each patient state suggested by our model, the response from the
physician regarding the new patient state is received and processed by a physician belief state machine.
For each pathophysiological state machine, we develop a physician belief state machine with exactly
same pathophysiological states. However, the transitions between the states are enabled according to
physician response.
Therefore, the two pathophysiological state machines may have different active states at runtime,
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which indicates physician’s intended or unintended deviation. If the physician does not approve the
pathophysiological state suggested by the model, the physician state machine does not transition to
the suggested state. Moreover, at each time physician may decide to transition (jump) to a new state
independent of the states suggested by our models. Figure 2.7 shows the arrhythmia state machine and
its corresponding physician belief machine.
This compositional approach results in more modular model, in which the organ and physician
models can be validated and verified independently. As was shown in Figure 2.5, there is no interaction
between a pathophysiological state machine and its corresponding physician machine. Furthermore,
physician belief state machines for different pathophysiological processes do not interact either.
We have also added a logging interface to our model that can be used for keeping record of de-
viations, when the models are integrated into the guidance system. Such records may be used for
additional review (can be specifically useful for residents). According to [61], failure to debrief after
code is one of common errors made in cardiac arrest care and the logging feature can help alleviate this
situation. Furthermore, the logs can also be analyzed by the developers to improve the precision of the
proposed models.
Convergence-Divergence Protocol: The compositional model allows us to track and record the
physician belief on the current states. To allow some degree of flexibility, while reducing the unintended
deviation from best practice guidelines we propose the divergence-convergence protocol. When there
is a discrepancy between a pathophysiological state machine and its corresponding physician state
machine an initial alert is generated to reduce any unintended deviation. If patient state continues to
deteriorate or remains the same, two additional alerts are generated by the system. Note that all the
timer-related values are configurable. After discussion with our physician collaborators, we designed
the last alert to be triggered by a longer timer. When we transition to a new pathophysiological state
and the best practice and physician diagnoses are still inconsistent, the timer routine restarts. However,
if the patient state improves the model (by design) converges with the physician’s belief The protocol
steps are presented in Pseudocode 1.
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2.4.2 Guideline Model
The guideline model encodes best practice monitoring and treatment guidelines. As mentioned
previously, physicians often specify these guidelines for different pathophysiological and disease states.
Therefore, our proposed modeling paradigm can efficiently encode them.
In most of current clinical guideline models and system, different elements of the patient state in-
formation are often used to express preconditions, therapy goals, etc. At each point in time, our model
represent the patient state as a set of pathophysiological states (and an aggregated disease state). This
representation resemble a patient scenario that can be used to determine the entry point to the guide-
lines. For example, when patient enters acute lung injury state, the ventilation therapy workflow must
be executed. However, different patient state items may also be used to check preconditions or goals
at different states of the chosen workflow. For example patient’s blood pressure may be monitored to
evaluate the effectiveness of fluid resuscitation.
Alarm Management: In this section we also focus on addressing the challenge of alarm man-
agement. Our main goal is to reduce slips and lapse caused by inadequate alarm configuration and
practices. Such an alarm management must be incorporated into best practice monitoring guidelines
for the disease under study.
Most current medical systems raise alerts based on single measurements, which creates considerable
false positive alerts. Identifying the relation between measurements and structuring them according to
organ pathophysiology adds a layer of intelligence to patient state representation.
We use the notion of actionable alerts, which follows the same line of reasoning as actionable states,
which was describe in Section 2.3. In fact, by encoding the alerts on patient state changes in already
defines actionable states we ensure that they are comprehensive and integrated with pathophysiological
sates. These alerts may also be issued on patient’s response to treatments or best practice treatment
option for the current pathophysiological states.
The alerts on development or resolution of organ insufficiency states are encoded in individual patho-
physiological states. These alerts only depend on the information from the corresponding pathophysio-
logical process. There are no interaction between different pathophysiological processes and therefore
these alerts can be encoded independent of each other. For example, the alert indicating patient has
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developed moderate renal insufficiency is encoded in the renal state machine.
However, the alerts on progress of the disease under study is encode in the disease state machine.
These alerts require information from several pathophysiological processes. This aggregated infor-
mation is encoded in the disease states and the disease state machine is the best place to encode this
category of alerts. For example, the alert indicating a septic patient has deteriorated to septic shock is
encoded in the sepsis state machine.
Best practice guidelines regarding best practice-recommended monitoring extent and frequency may
also be encoded similarly. In states with higher degree of insufficiency, the medical staff may require to
monitor more frequently or monitor more relevant measurements. Since these monitoring requirements
are often categorized according to organ insufficiency and disease progress stage, the corresponding
guideline can be encoded in the corresponding pathophysiological and disease states. Each alert mes-
sage has the following items:
• The new disease/pathophysiological state (and the corresponding process).
• Patient state change type: improvement or deterioration.
• The current value of relevant measurements.
• The normal range for each of the above measurements.
• Recommended treatment and monitoring actions.
Note that the treatment actions recommended in these alert messages are presented in abstract; more
detailed treatment alerts will be discussed later. Examples of alert messages will be presented in Chap-
ters 3 and 4.
2.5 Model Verification
As mentioned in Chapter 1, the desired model behaviors must always hold, not just in the limited
clinical simulation. We address this challenge by performing model checking and formally verifying
the safety and system properties.
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To formally verify the correctness of the models, we use UPPAAL model checker tool. Currently,
the translation from Yakindu to UPPAAL is done manually. The correctness of the translation is a
challenge that also needs to be addressed but is outside the scope of this paper. However, the UPPAAL
model-checker is also based on the theory of timed automata and this make the translation process less
complex. In [62] automatic translation of Yakindu models to UPPAAL is discussed. However, in this
paper the translation is done manually until such research works mature.
As mentioned before, we use an open source tool, called Yakindu, to develop the models. The tool
provides an integrated modeling environment and development based on the concept of statecharts.
To make the translation to UPPAAL less complex, we avoided using composite states, supported by
statecharts, in the Yakindu models. UPPAAL model checker tool does not support composite states.
Therefore, using them in our organ models would make the task of translation to UPPAAL more com-
plex and possibly error-prone. Another reason for avoiding composite states is to maintain the model
simplicity for clinical validation by physicians. Understanding complex computer science concepts,
such as composite states, would be a non-trivial tasks for the physicians. Our goal is to keeps the mod-
els as simple and intuitive as possible. Note that we use the orthogonal regions supported in statecharts
to represent a set of concurrent organ models, which we develop to track concurrent changes in the
patient state. In UPPAAL, a system is also modeled as a network of communicating state machines.
This makes the task of translation to UPPAAL and formal verification more straightforward.
The Yakindu models may include state and transition actions. Since UPPAAL only supports transi-
tion actions, we also translated any necessary state action to a transition action. In Yakindu, the state
actions include entry, exit and timer based actions. The entry action should be performed once when
entering the state. We translated this to an action assigned to all the incoming transitions to the cor-
responding state. The exit action, which must be executed when existing the state, was translated to
actions on all the outgoing transitions. For the timer-based state actions, we created a self-transition
and used the timer as transition guard. Figure 3.6 shows the Yakindu arrhythmia model and its corre-
sponding UPPAAL model, constructed manually. The four states are mapped to four locations, each
representing an arrhythmia state. The entry state actions are translated to updates on all the incoming
transitions to the corresponding states.
As explained previously, and also illustrated in Figure 2.5, there is no direct interaction among dif-
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Figure 2.8: Model-Driven Design for Clinical Guidance System
ferent pathophysiological state machines or physician belief state machines. Furthermore, a pathophys-
iological state machine does not interact with its corresponding physician belief state machine either.
This improves verification modularity and therefore we can verify most of the developed models sep-
arately. All the interaction are encapsulated in the disease and guideline models and their correctness
and safety properties must be verified as part of verification of these modeling components.
After constructing the UPPAAL models, (a subset of identified) clinical requirements must be for-
malized as (timed) computation tree logic, CTL, formulas and verified using UPPAAL model checker.
The exact formula depends on the disease under study. We present the set of verified propertied for our
cardiac arrest model in Chapter 3.
2.6 Model Integration
As discussed earlier, developing efficient and accurate clinical models is the first step in design
of guidance systems. As the next step, the models must be integrated into the guidance to derive
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its execution. The models interact with the guidance system using our handwritten communication
code.The model integration also provides a more user-friendly environment for simulation of different
clinical scenarios. This would allow physicians to validate the correctness and usefulness of developed
models more efficiently.
Figure 2.8 shows the approach we have followed to integrate the developed models with an existing
guidance system. It also summarizes the steps involved in the construction, verification and integra-
tion of the clinical models. At the first step, we translated the generic medical knowledge into a set
of communicating finite state machines. We used our proposed organ-centric paradigm, in which we
model patient state as a network of pathophysiological and disease state machines. We also used the
finite state machine formalism to develop a best practice guideline model that encodes all the moni-
toring and treatment guidelines. A compositional approach was also proposed to handle and track the
physician interaction with the system. We use the open source tool, Yakindu, to develop the models.
The tool provides an integrated modeling environment and development based on the concept of stat-
echarts. The tool also allows simulation of the developed model to validate its dynamic behavior [8].
Next, the finalized Yakindu models were manually translated to UPPAAL for exhaustive verification of
clinical and system requirements. The clinical requirements are formalized as computation tree logic
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formulas and along side the system requirements are verified using UPPAAL. Note that any necessary
modification to UPPAAL model are reflected back to the Yakindu Model.
Now, at this step we integrate the verified models with an existing guidance system interface, us-
ing some handwritten communication code. The Java code can be generated automatically from the
Yakindu model and integrated with the existing system using some hand-written glue code. However,
the tool also allows direct interaction between the Yakindu model and existing Java code. Therefore,
for visualization purposes we have integrated our cardiac arrest and sepsis model with an existing
guidance systems, previously developed by our research group. The models interact with the existing
system using our handwritten communication code. The patient data entered into the guidance system
is communicated to our models through the communication (glue) code. This allows use simulate dif-
ferent clinical scenarios. The generated monitoring and treatment guidelines by the models are sent to
the guidance system to be displayed for medical staff. The physician response to the generated guide-
lines are also recorded by the system and communicated back to our model 3.Figure 2.9 shows the
communication flow between the models and guidance system.
2.7 Clinical Validation
Through simulation of our model-driven guidance system, we validate clinical correctness and use-
fulness of the models. A set of clinical requirements have been drafted in collaboration with physicians.
In the process of developing our organ-centric pathophysiological organ models, we have gone through
multiple iterations of design, validation and close discussion with our ICU physician collaborators. The
executable organ models allow us to simulate the disease under study. The clinical simulation provides
an environment for dynamic validation of the models. Physicians can also directly look at these organ
models and cross reference with the specified clinical requirements. Note that, the developed mod-
els are at same level of abstraction the medical knowledge and reasoning are known to physician. At
our proposed level of abstraction, physicians with minimal IT background can easily understand the
models and review the design. If directly implemented in procedural style using a high level language
such as Java, organ-centric patient state representation could not be easily validated by physicians. We
3In our sepsis guidance system, we have added Approve and Hold buttons to our guideline alert messages. The physician
response is recorded by tracking which button is clicked for each guideline item.
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then apply the necessary changes, as suggested by physician(s), and re-validate the refined model. The
following are a subset of clinical requirements validated for the developed organ models:
• CR1: All the pathophysiological processes relevant to the disease under study are modeled.
• CR2: All the insufficiency states, recognized by medical textbooks, are modeled for each patho-
physiological process.
• CR3: The correct and only necessary subset of physiological measurements are used to define
the states in each automaton.
• CR4: The definition of insufficiency states are correct.
• CR5: Any changes in the physiological measurements will result in transition(s) to the correct
insufficiency state(s).
We have shown our developed models and simulation of cardiac arrest scenario to our physician
collaborators for clinical validation. More details are presented in the next chapter. Note that each
pathophysiological process and its corresponding physician belief state machine has the exact same
states. The transitions are simply enabled by the physician input. The correctness of the physician
models are formally verified using UPPAAL.
Next, we describe how the modeling guidelines, presented in Section 2.3, can be applied to construct
the cardiac arrest and sepsis models. We provide more details on formal verification, integration and
validation of the constructed models. In Chapter 3, we also discuss the preliminary clinical validation
we have conducted of our model-driven guidance system at a Carle ACLS training class.
2.8 Research Publications
The following is our published research paper on organ-centric modeling paradigm and integration
of the models into a best practice guidance system:
• M. Rahmaniheris, P. Wu, L. Sha, and R. B., Berlin, ”An Organ-Centric Best Practice Assist Sys-
tem for Acute Care”, IEEE 29th International Symposium on Computer-Based Medical Systems
(CBMS 2016) [63]
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We are in the process of preparing the following paper, on the proposed model-driven guidance
system design and evaluation. This paper will be submitted to IEEE Real-Time Systems Symposium
(RTSS) 2017:
• M. Rahmaniheris, Y. Jiang, P. Wu, and L. Sha, Design and Evaluation of Model-Driven Guid-
ance Systems for Acute Care”
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Chapter 3
Cardiac Arrest Case Study
We first briefly describe the cardiovascular organ system and its pathophysiology. This is by no mean
a thorough description. The cardiovascular system consists of the heart and blood vessel. The main
responsibility of this organ system is to support blood circulation to provide nutrients, oxygen, etc.
to different parts of the human body. Another task performed by this organ system is to support the
CO2 and O2 exchanges in the lungs that stabilize blood PH , which is the measure of acidity of the
blood. We can categorize the different pathophysiological states of the cardiovascular organ system
into four main insufficiencies. The first category represent the conditions, in which the blood flow is
blocked or partially blocked. This can be the result of different cardiovascular disease such as blood
clot, hardening and narrowing of the artery, peripheral artery disorder or circulatory shock. The second
category represents the abnormalities in heart rhythm, which leads to significant drop of cardiac out-
put and impairs blood circulation. The insufficient blood circulation in the lungs to perform the CO2
and O2 exchange results in CO2 accumulation in the blood and causes a rise in blood PH level. This
plays an important role in our case study on cardiac arrest. Abnormal blood gas levels and dysregulated
blood pressure are the third and fourth categories. Table 5.1 shows a subset of cardiovascular states rel-
evant to the intelligent management of devices. We have verified this abstract model of cardiovascular
insufficiency states with the physician, who collaborates closely with our research group.
Cardiac arrest is the sudden loss of heart function, which is caused by the loss of the heart’s electrical
and muscular pumping function. Following cardiac resuscitation efforts, the heart rhythm may change
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and include abnormal or irregular heart rhythms or waveforms (arrhythmias). The heart may beat
chaotically during resuscitation, which leads to significant drop of cardiac output and impairs blood
circulation. The insufficient blood circulation in the lungs impedes the CO2 andO2 exchange resulting
in CO2 accumulation in the blood, which may be related to a decrease in blood pH level.
Cardiac arrest can lead to death within minutes. The guideline provided by American Heart As-
sociation (AHA) to reverse the cardiac arrest includes cardiopulmonary resuscitation (CPR), using the
defibrillator device to shock the heart by delivering a therapeutic dose of electrical energy to the heart,
and administration of intravenous drugs such as epinephrine [64], [65]. Epinephrine is a vessel con-
strictor that stimulates the heart and increases the arterial blood pressure.
The patient’s blood pressure, heart rate, blood O2 saturation must be monitored continuously. An
electrocardiography machine, EKG machine, must be attached to the patient to monitor the heart’s
electrical activity and rhythm. However, the defibrillator may only be used if a shockable rhythm is
present. Pulseless ventricular tachycardia and ventricular fibrillation are considered shockable. If the
EKGmachine indicates pulseless electrical activity or asystole, which is flat line, shocking a patient’s
heart will be ineffective and is commonly contraindicated. If the rhythm is not shockable, epinephrine
is often administered through intravenous access.
A patient in cardiac arrest may develop acidosis which is indicated when blood gas analysis is per-
formed during resuscitation. In this cardiovascular state blood acidity level is abnormally high, indi-
cated by low value of blood pH . This is caused by poor tissue perfusion and blood oxygenation during
cardiac arrest. On the other hand, acidosis if severe may be one of the potential adverse conditions un-
der which epinephrine may be less effective. At times, it is recommended to correct the severe acidosis
by improving the CO2 andO2 exchange and by administering to the patient a base medication, sodium
bicarbonate. There are times when such therapy may improve the effectiveness of epinephrine.
In addition to the cardiovascular organ system, as resuscitation efforts continue, it may be found that
the lung (pulmonary) and kidney (renal) organ systems are also affected. In this paper we demonstrate
a subset of possible interactions between the cardiac and kidney organ systems in our computational
model. Moderate or severe renal insufficiency can affect the treatment plan for a the cardiac arrest
patient. For a patient with kidney insufficiency, there may be times when other medications may be
preferred in place of epinephrine due to some reports of epinephrine toxicity in the face of kidney dys-
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Figure 3.1: The Relevant Pathophysiological Processes for Cardiac Arrest
function. Other vasoactive medications to consider may include dobutamine and levophed depending
on patient condition [66]. In case of severe renal insufficiency, where the patient shows signs of hy-
perkalemia 1, it may also be recommended to use calcium chloride infusion through the intravenous to
treat the effects of a very high potassium level on the heart.
In the following sections we discuss how the organ-centric pathophysiology-based cardiac arrest
model can be constructed by applying the modeling guidelines presented in Section 2.3.
3.1 Model Construction
We start by applying our first modeling guideline, G1. Cardiac arrest causes several abnormalities
mainly in cardiovascular organ system. These include abnormal heart rhythm and imbalance in arterial
blood gas levels, including blood acidity level. According to this guideline, a pathophysiological pro-
cess becomes relevant if the corresponding physiological function is affected by the disease or affect the
treatment. Therefore, blood gas imbalance and arrhythmia are relevant pathophysiological processes
that must be tracked when monitoring and treating a cardiac arrest patient. In addition to the cardio-
vascular organ system, as describe above, it may be found that the kidney (renal) organ system is also
affected. On the other hand, moderate or severe renal insufficiency can affect the treatment can affect
1High level of potassium in blood
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(a) Best Practice
(b) Physician Belief
Figure 3.2: Arrhythmia State Machines
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(a) Best Practice
(b) Physician Belief
Figure 3.3: Blood Gas Imbalance State Machines
the choice of vasoactive agent to reverse cardiac arrest. Therefore, renal insufficiency process becomes
relevant to cardiac arrest, because not only the kidney organ system may be affected by the disease but
also the renal insufficiency state can affect its treatment plan. We also had a series of discussions with
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our ICU physician collaboratives to confirm the identified pathophysiological processes for our cardiac
arrest model.
Next, we follow G2 and identify the information that is important, but not need to be encoded in
the same details as others in our cardiac arrest model. As explained above, kidney is not the main
affected organ system and only the severity of renal insufficiency, if any, must be known to safely and
effectively adapt the treatment plan. Therefore, the medical information regarding the pathophysiology
of kidney organ system are aggregated as degree of renal insufficiency. On the other hand, more derails
are needed regarding the cardiovascular system. For example, we encode arrhythmia and blood gas
imbalance separately in our cardiac arrest model. It is not simply sufficient to represent all the changes
in the cardiovascular organ system by an aggregated degree of insufficiency.
At this stage, we must determine the concurrency level of our cardiac arrest model. According
to G3, the affected physiological functions that need to be tracked simultaneously must be modeled
by separate finite state machines. If G2 has already been applied, following this guideline becomes
straightforward. Previously, we specified the different (aggregated) pathophysiological states need to
be tracked for a cardiac arrest patient. To keep track of all these states and prevent any critical changes
from being overlooked we model each process using a separate state machine. Therefore, we need to
develop three state machines for the cardiac arrest model: arrhythmia,blood gas imbalance (BGI), and
renal insufficiency. Figure 3.1 shows our proposed hierarchical model for the cardiac arrest.
Now, must define the states for each of the identified pathophysiological state machines. There are
measurements, which physicians often interpret together to have a better assessment. In the arrhythmia
state machine each state is defined by correlating EKG rhythm with blood pressure and heart rate.
To assess the degree of renal insufficiency creatinine, BUN and potassium are looked at as a group.
We use these three measurement as the state variables for the renal insufficiency state machine. The
measurements in ABG test, PaO2, PaCO2 and pH , are used to define different blood gas imbalance
states.
However, defining a large number of states can make the model very complex and unmanageable.
In guideline G4, we introduced the notions of actionable states. Not all the changes in physiological
measurements are relevant or useful for a given disease. Providing too much information and too
many alerts to the medical staff may create confusion and increase their mental overload. We define
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a new state when there is a need for new monitoring and therapeutic plan. The actionable states can
be extracted from the requirements that specify the organ states, which trigger an action from the
medical staff. For example, to adapt the cardiac arrest treatment plan, we only require to know if the
patient has developed any renal insufficiency, and whether it is moderate or severe. Therefore, we
can identify three actionable states for the kidney state machine: Normal Renal Function, Moderate
Renal Insufficiency and Severe Renal Insufficiency. Fo the other tw state machines the actionable alerts
can be directly extracted for best practice guidelines. In ACLS algorithm, which is the workflow
provided by American Heart Association to reveres cardiac arrest, four arrhythmia states are identified:
V entricular Tachycardia, V entricular F ibrillation, Asystole and PEA. Therefore, we define
five actionable states, including these four arrhythmia states and an additional state representing sinus
rhythm. However, we decided not to define a separate state for Asystole, since it can be easily detected
and has the same treatment plan as PEA. Lastly, we have identified three main arterial blood gas
abnormalities from medical literature: metabolic acidosis, hypercapnia, and respiratory acidosis. We
define three actionable states corresponding to these identified abnormalities and an additional state to
represent normal blood gas levels.
After defining the states, we must identify the correct and optimal number of transitions by consid-
ering the underlying medical knowledge. According to guideline G5, when continuous physiological
variables are used to define different states, the transitions are only defined to represent the progress of
insufficiency. This case applies to blood gas imbalance (BGI), and renal insufficiency state machines.
We only define an edge between the states that represent gradual deterioration and improvement. Note
that, since we have only three actionable states in the renal state machine and we define a transition
from the initial state to all the others, the application of this guidelines cannot be explicitly observed
from the final constructed model. In the arrhythmia state machine, we require to define transition be-
tween all insufficiency states since a discrete measurement, that is KG rhythm, is used as state variable.
Figures 3.2(a)), 3.3(a), and 3.4(a)) show the final constructed state machines resulted from applica-
tion of the modeling guidelines. Figures 3.2(b)), 3.3(b), and 3.4(b)) show the corresponding physician
models for each pathophysiological process. They are constructed following the approach described in
Section 2.4.1. All the models have been developed using Yakindu.
Note that the last guideline, G6, has been partially followed since we do not define any interaction
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(a) Best Practice
(b) Physician Belief
Figure 3.4: Renal Insufficiency State Machines
between the three pathophysiological state machines. We codify any dependency and indirect interac-
tion between them in a central guideline model.
3.1.1 Cardiac Arrest Guideline Model
Thee guideline model for cardiac arrest has been also developed using finite state machine formal-
ism. The monitoring and treatment guidelines are categorized according to patient pathophysiological
states. We define the patient state S as a tuple (S1, S2, . . . , Sn), in which Si is the current state in
ith pathophysiological process and n is the total number of these processes developed for the disease
under study. In cardiac arrest model, n = 3 and S = (V Tach,Metabolic Acidosis,Moderate Renal
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Insufficiency) can be an example of patient aggregated state.
The guideline model for the cardiac arrest scenario codifies the ACLS2 algorithm provided by Amer-
ican Heart Association (AHA) and other well-established guidelines recommended by our physician
collaborators. We model the cardiac arrest guidelines using a single state machine. Note that, the
guideline model may also include several state machines, which can be executed concurrently or their
execution can be synchronized using another top-level guideline manager. We provide more details
when discussing sepsis case study in Chapter 4. Figure 3.5 show the ACLS algorithm.
The cardiac arrest guideline state machine periodically communicates with all the organ models
to get their current states and determine the current patient state. As mentioned before, the encoded
guidelines are categorized to patient state defined as explained above. Therefore, when the patient
states changes, the best practice model determines the subset of guidelines for the current patient state.
The guideline state machine codifies any potential interaction between different modeling components.
In the above example, treatment plan for V Tach may need to be adapted because the patient has
developed renal insufficiency. The guideline state machine contains all the required information to
encode interactions or other dependency relations such as the one just described. The following are
examples of encoded cardiac arrest guidelines:
• All medical staff must consider shock when V Tach or V Fib rhythm is confirmed.
• All medical staff must avoid shock when PEA or Asystole rhythm is confirmed
• The physician must consider vasoactive agents such as epinephrine to correct arrhythmia.
• Epinephrine may not be effective for a cardiac arrest patient with low blood pH level. It may be
recommended to consider Bicarbonate to treat the high level of acidity.
• For a cardiac arrest patient with renal insufficiency, it may be recommended to adjust fluid re-
suscitation parameters and substitute epinephrine with other vasoactive agents such as levophed,
which are less harmful to kidney.
In Section 3.3, we explain how the constructed pathophysiological and guideline models are used
2Advanced Cardiac Life Support
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Figure 3.5: ACLS Guidelines for Cardiac Arrest Resuscitation
to derive the execution of our cardiac arrest guidance system. However, the clinical correctness of the
models must be validated and formally verified before they can be integrated into the guidance system.
3.2 Formal Verification
We use the UPPAAL model checker tool to verify a set of formalized safety properties. We followed
the approach explained in Section 2.5, and manually translated all the models to UPPAAL. Figure
3.6(b) shows the arrhythmia UPPAAL model, as an example. The arrhythmia Yakindu model is also
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(a) Yakindu Model
(b) UPPAAL Model
Figure 3.6: Arrhythmia Yakindu and UPPAAL Models
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Property Formula
P1 A[]Not Deadlock
P2 E <> ArrhythmiaBP.V entricularF ibrillation
P3 A <> ((Rhythm == V FIB && BP  20) =) ArrhythmiaBP.V entricularF ibrillation)
P4 A <> (ArrhythmiaBP.V entricularF ibrillation =) (Rhythm == V FIB && BP  20))
P5 E <> BGI BestPractice.MetabolicAcidosis
P6 A <> BGI BestPractice.MetabolicAcidosis =) (pH < PH LOW THRESHOLD)
P7 A[] BGI Physician.MetabolicAcidosis =) Physician BGI State == METABOLIC ACIDOSIS
P8 A <> (BGI BestPractice.MetabolicAcidosis && BGI Physician.NormalBloodGasLevels) =)
(MetabolicAcidosis DeviationCounter > 0)
Table 3.1: List of Verified Cardiac Arrest Safety Properties
shown in Figure 3.6(a) to better illustrate the correspondence between the tow models. A subset of
validated clinical requirements and several system requirements are formalized as (timed) computation
tree logic, CTL, formulas. A subset of verified properties are shown in Table 3.1. The absence of
deadlock in the model is formalized as P1 and P2 is an example of reachability properties. The safety
properties P3 and P4 are examples of formalized state and transition definition correctness properties
for arrhythmia model. The property P7 ensures the correctness of physician model and P8 is a safety
property of the divergence-convergence protocol.
3.3 Cardiac Arrest Guidance System
To further demonstrate how the models can be used to design clinical systems, we have integrated
our models in a cardiac arrest guidance system following the approach presented in Section 2.6 and
illustrated in Figure 2.8. The integration is done using formally verified Yakindu models. The Java
code can be generated automatically from the Yakindu model and integrated with the existing system
interface using some hand-written glue code. However, the tool also allows direct interaction between
the Yakindu model and existing Java code. Therefore, for visualization purposes we have integrated our
cardiac arrest model with an existing guidance systems, previously developed by our research group.
All the physiological measurements and relevant lab values can be entered through the guidance
system user interface. We have defined a set of events in Yakindu to emulate the physician’s response
to the system’s suggestions; the state machines respond to the activation of these signals (which occurs
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Figure 3.7: Signals Simulating Interaction with Attending Physician
when one clicks on the corresponding signal). A screen shot showing a subset of such signals is shown
in Figure 3.7. The threshold values may also be changed in the Yakindu model at both configuration
time and during model simulation. If the new patient state is not confirmed or a different organ state
is entered by the physician, the convergence-divergence protocol, as explained in Section 2.4.1, is
executed. However, if the new patient state is confirmed, the new guidelines are sent to the system to
be displayed for medical staff.
Figure 3.8(a) shows a snapshot of our simulation run including the organ models (Statechart im-
plementation) and the graphical display. The snapshot shows a point in the simulation, in which the
patient’s blood pH value indicates metabolic acidosis. However, the physician does not approve the
pathophysiological state suggested by the system. Therefore, Blood Gas Imbalance state machine and
its corresponding physician state machine have different runtime states. As shown in Figure 3.8(b), the
deviation from best practice guided acidosis diagnosis is logged by the system. Note that when blood
pH goes above the threshold, BGI state machine automatically transitions to Normal Blood Gas Levels
state and converges with the physician diagnosis. This case is not shown. When physician approves
the pathophysiological states suggested by the system, the subset of best practice guidelines applicable
to the current patient state are placed on the guidance system display. Figure 3.9 shows a simulation
snapshot, in which PEA rhythm, metabolic acidosis and renal insufficiency states have been approved
by physician. As another example, we simulated the case in which there is an inconsistency between
correlated measurements. In the previous scenario, where the EKG rhythm indicates ventricular tachy-
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cardia, the heart rate and blood pressure values are consistent. On the other hand, Figure 3.10 shows the
alert message generated by the system when blood pressure is, according to best practice monitoring
guidelines, inconsistent with the PEA (pulseless electrical activity) rhythm. The inconsistent measure-
ment is shown on a red background on the graphic display. For more information on our cardiac arrest
developed model and guidance system refer to [67]. The readers can also run their own simulation
for the encoded scenarios by accessing the required files [67]. Moreover, a video showing our system
simulation for additional scenarios can be accessed here [68].
3.4 Clinical Validation
Physicians play the main role in validating the clinical correctness of our models. We also depend
on them to assess the usefulness of the guidance system in terms of improving patient state assessment
and adherence to the best practice guidelines.
3.4.1 Correctness
We demonstrated our system simulation to a team of ICU medical staff at Carle hospital [69] to
ensure clinical correctness of the encoded guidelines such as the ones presented above. The following
are a subset of clinical requirements for the cardiac arrest, which are instantiations of the generic
requirements presented in Section 2.7.
• CR1: All the pathophysiological processes relevant to cardiac arrest are modeled.
• CR2: All the relevant abnormal rhythms are modeled in the Arrhythmia machine.
• CR3: EKG rhythm, HR and BP are the correct and necessary physiological measurements to
define different arrhythmia states.
• CR4: The definition of arrhythmia, BGI and renal insufficiency states are correct.
• CR5: Any changes in blood pH and/or PaCO2 will result in transition to the correct BGI state.
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Figure 3.8: Inconsistent Physician and Best Practice Blood Gas Imbalance Automata
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Figure 3.9: Best Practice Guidelines Generated by our System
Figure 3.10: EKG Rhythm and Blood Pressure Inconsistency Alert
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Figure 3.11: Medical SimMan 3G Manikin in Carle ACLS Training Class
3.4.2 Usefulness
One of challenges encountered in developing any guideline model or designing clinical guidance
system is to determine relevant medical knowledge to be encoded in the model. Furthermore, iden-
tifying what guideline items and at which time to be presented to clinical staff is critical. These are
deciding factors for usability of the system in actual clinical environment or for the purpose of train-
ing nurses or residents. We conducted a preliminary evaluation of our cardiac arrest guidance system
in a ACLS training class with 18 medical personnel consisting of physicians and nurses from Carle
Foundation Hospital.
Note that there are two versions of cardiac arrest guidance system. The version presented in this
thesis is designed based on organ-centric pathophysiology-based model can be simulated and evalu-
ated before code generation. The first version was developed using traditional procedural style ap-
proaches. There is also a 2-part study protocol in place in collaboration with Carle hospital ICU
department.These studies will evaluate our cardiac arrest guidance system in terms of usability, record-
ing accuracy and improvement in adherence to ACLS workflow; and compare them with the traditional
approach of memorizing workflows and using paper and pencil for recording.
Using our model-driven cardiac arrest guidance4 system, we conducted two sets of simulations on
the medical SimMan 3GManikin 3, which is used for training purpose (Figure 3.11). One set of simula-
3http://www.laerdal.com/us/SimMan3G
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Metric Explanation
Mental'Demand How'much'mental'or'perceptual'activity'was'required
Physical'Demand How'much'physical'activity'was'required?
Temporal'Demand How'hurried'or'rushed'was'the'pace'of'the'task?
Performance How'successful'were'you'in'performing'the'task?'
(Lower'score'means'better'performance)
Effort How'hard'did'you'have'to'work'to'accomplish'the'task?
Frustration How'insecure,'discouraged,'irritated,'and'stressed,'did'you'feel'
during'the'task?
Figure 3.12: NASA Task Load Index Metrics
tions was done with our guidance system and one without the system. Each set includes three different
cardiac arrest scenarios. In each simulation, a medical team consists of four to eight members follow
ACLS algorithm to resuscitate a cardiac arrest patient , whose state dynamically changes according to
the scenario. The resuscitation process includes managing patient’s airway and breathing, diagnosing
the rhythm, performing CPR, shock therapy and administration of constrictive medication.
After the medical team finished the two scenarios, they evaluated their workload using the six metrics
in NASA Task Load Index (NASA-TLX) questionnaire. The metrics and their descriptions is shown
in Figure 3.12. NASA-TLX [70] is a commonly used subjective assessment tool that rates perceived
workload in order to evaluate users performance. It has been used in various domains, including avia-
tion and healthcare. The physicians and nurses gave a score from 1 to 20 for each metric, and the lower
score means the lower demand, better performance, and less effort and frustration.
Figure 3.13 shows the average score for each of the six metrics from the 18 physicians and nurses.
Our system greatly reduces the mental demand and temporal demand, because the relevant clinical
information which is critical to assessment of patient is provided by the system. This makes easier for
medical staff to track patient’s state and response to treatments in realtime. Moreover, the medical staff
believed the guidance system help them with their performance. In addition, the effort and frustration
levels are also low, which suggests that the displayed information is critical and easy for medical staff
to comprehend.
We also ask them to rate the usefulness of different guideline items provided by the system, using
a similar 20-point scoring system. A higher score means a more useful guideline item. The following
are the list of specific guideline items included in this evaluation:
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Figure 3.13: NASA TLX Evaluation Results from 18 Clinicians
1. Alerts on inconsistencies between the diagnosed rhythm and the physiological measurements
(Ex: VT rhythm and heart rate = 80 bpm)
2. Alerts on out-of-range drug dosage (Ex: Order 5.0 mg of EPI)
3. Alerts on total drug injection count (Ex: Inject EPI more than 3 times )
4. Alerts on checking ETCO2 when getting close to the end of 2 minutes of CPR
5. Alerts on treatment contraindications (Ex1:Alert on low pH, when EPI is ordered, Ex2: Alert on
Non-shockable rhythm when Shock is ordered)
6. Alerts on treatment guidelines when patient condition changes (Ex1: Consider injecting Bicar-
bonate, when pH is below 7.2, Ex2: Shock when the rhythm is VT or VF)
Table 3.2 shows the average score for each guideline item according to the rating from 11 clinicians.
All average scores are above 17, which indicates that the clinical users in the ACLS training class
found these guideline items very useful. We have conducted this evaluation to specifically address the
second part of designChallenges 6, that is assessing the effectiveness and safety of any proposed alarm
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Guideline Item Avergae Usefulness Score
Measurement Inconsistency Alert 17.2
Out-of-Range Drug Dosage Alert 17.9
Total Drug Injection Count Alert 18.1
ETCO2 Check Alert 18.3
Treatment Contraindications Alert 17.7
Treatment Guidelines Alert 17.3
Table 3.2: Guideline Usefulness Evaluation Results from 11 Clinicians
management. The first part of this challenge describes the necessity of an alarm management approach
to reduce slips and lapse caused by inadequate alarm configuration and practices.
Another goal was evaluating the usefulness of our communication model. According to [5], two
styles of communication are often followed in clinical guidance systems: consulting model vs. cri-
tiquing model. In a consulting model the system actively provides monitoring and treatment guide-
lines. However, in a critiquing model physician already has a plan in place, possibly with a set of goals
expressed in terms of patient state. The system only generates alerts or provide other guideline items
when the physician is deviating from the plan or moving further away from the goal.
Our model-driven guidance system follows a combination of these two communication models. We
believe, in some instances clinical staff prefer the second model; we have verified this to some degree in
our evaluation. The challenge is how to determine when to use each communication model. We found
out that one determining factor is the level of experience of the clinical user. We use this information
and applied it to our sepsis guidance system. Three guidance levels are defined in our system: high
for inexperience users, medium for users with some degree of experience such as residents, and low for
the most experienced users. The guideline items are flagged with a level as well. The clinical user can
choose a guidance level and only the guideline items corresponding to chosen level will be displayed.
The other factors can be disease and the procedure. For example, in our evaluation of cardiac arrest
guidance system, we found out that for some procedures such as CPR, drug administration, or shock
therapy the clinical users prefer a critiquing communication model. They do not want to be bothered
with message such as ”The rhythm is VTach; Consider Shock”; however, if for any reason they are
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about to shock a patient with PEA rhythm, they find an alert to help them avoid mistakingly shocking
the patient useful. On the other hand, in the case of sepsis screening and management some clinical
staff ay need some handling during the care process and therefore, prefer a consulting communication
model. However, we should note that these findings are only based on our preliminary evaluation
and further studying of different case studies required to draw a more thorough and clear specific
conclusions.
The overall lesson learned is that only adequate but not excessive guideline data for making informed
decision must be presented to clinical users. Generating excessive number of warnings for minor
problems must be avoided. Providing more focused patient-specific information and flagging abnormal
things which otherwise would have been overlooked are steps into right direction. Providing excessive
information prevents the clinical staff form processing and synthesizing information intelligently and
rapidly. This is specifically important for intensive care units, since they can be considered the classic
example of information overload.
We also demonstrated our system simulation to a team of ICU medical staff at Carle hospital [69]
to ensure clinical correctness of the encoded guidelines such as the ones presented above. They also
found several aspects of our system specifically helpful, including the following:
• Organizing the available measurements and relevant clinical data according to an organ-centric
structure. For example, our kidney state machine uses BUN, creatinine, and potassium to define
different states of renal insufficiency. In addition to displaying individual measurements, our
system also informs the physician of the severity of renal insufficiency, determined according
to best practice monitoring guidelines [66]. Codifying a layer of intelligence on top of raw
measurements allows our system to provide more relevant contextual information about patient’s
condition (in terms of current state of different organ systems). Our physician collaborators find
the structured contextual information, provided by the system, very useful.
• Informing the medical staff of any additional complications the cardiac arrest patient may de-
velop. For example, generating alerts when acidosis or renal insufficiency is suspected, while
epinephrine is being administered, can be very useful. Note that the best practice assist sys-
tem determines such insufficiency states according to the best practice guidelines encoded in our
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models. Medical staff can use this information to adjust the treatment plan and adhere to the best
practice guidelines.
• Raising an alert when there is an inconsistency between correlated measurements. Previously,
we presented an example, in which the system generates an alert message informing the medical
staff of an inconsistency between an EKG waveform indicating PEA and a blood pressure value
of greater than 20mmHg.
At the end of this section we include a direct quote from our ICU physician collaborator:
Healthcare providers are burdened at the patient’s bedside by a wealth of information, of-
ten from separate and disparate sources. The physician in particular must review, digest,
assimilate and apply increasing amounts of information in an ever-shortening time frame,
and identify which specific best practice guidelines should be used. Cardiac arrest is the
obvious example where multiple monitors, sensors, rhythms, lab values characterize the
patient care situation. Order must be brought to this enlarging problem as medical science
progresses. The organ based automata approach to software design within an assistant hi-
erarchy is a logical solution. Such a systematic structure mirrors how health care providers
learn and understand human disease. The development of these architectures will provide
medicine, especially acute care at the bedside, the computational interface that is needed.
3.5 Research Publications
The proposed system integration approach, and the result of our preliminary clinical evaluation of
cardiac arrest guidance system in the ACLS training class has led to the following submission:
• M. Rahmaniheris, Y. Jiang, P. Wu, and L. Sha, Design and Evaluation of Model-Driven Guid-
ance Systems for Acute Care” to be submitted to IEEE Real-Time Systems Symposium (RTSS)
2017
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Chapter 4
Sepsis Case Study
Sepsis is defined as life-threatening organ dysfunction caused by a dysregulated host response to in-
fection [71]. Early identification of sepsis helps increase the chance of timely interventions to treat the
cause of infection and manage sepsis. This improves the effectiveness of evidenced based therapies
and can greatly improve the survival rate. However, if it is not detected in early stages, the patient can
develop septic shock, which is defined as a subset of sepsis in which particularly profound circulatory
abnormalities are associated with a greater risk of mortality than with sepsis alone. Figure 4.1 illus-
trates the clinical criteria used for sepsis screening. This is according to the most recent definition of
sepsis [71]. According to surviving sepsis campaign [72], there are three main steps in the process of
diagnosis and treatment:
• Step 1: Screening andManagement of Infection. This step focuses on management of patients
identified as having infection by obtaining blood and other cultures as indicated, and administer-
ing tailored antibiotics as appropriate.
• Step 2: Screening for Organ Dysfunction and Management of Sepsis. If organ dysfunction
identified, sepsis workflow items, such as lactate measurement and fluid resuscitation, must be
initiated.
• Step 3: Identification and Management of Initial Hypotension. In addition to fluid resuscita-
tion, vasopressors must be administered to reach and maintain a normal mean arterial pressure.
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Singer,(Mervyn,(et(al.("The$third$international$consensus$definitions$for$sepsis$and$septic$shock$(sepsis43)."(Jama 315.8((2016):(801=810.
Figure 4.1: Clinical Criteria for Sepsis Screening
In the next section, we present the organ-centric pathophysiology-based sepsis model. We follow
the guidelines presented in Section 2.3 to construct the models.
4.1 Model Construction
We start by applying our first modeling guideline, G1. According to this guideline, a pathophysio-
logical process becomes relevant if the corresponding physiological function is affected by the disease
or affect the treatment. Figure 4.1 shows the main organ systems and physiological functions that may
be affected by sepsis. For example, mean arterial pressure (MAP) and coagulation insufficiencies are
examples of cardiovascular abnormalities. Therefore MAP dysregulation and coagulation insufficien-
cies are relevant pathophysiological processes that must be tracked when monitoring and treating a
cardiac arrest patient. The others are identified in a similar way. Figure 4.2 shows the complete list of
sepsis pathophysiological processes.
Next, we follow G2 and identify the information that is important, but not need to be encoded in
the same details as others in our sepsis model. As demonstrated in Figure 4.1, more cardiovascular
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Figure 4.2: Sepsis Pathophysiological State Machines
functions are affected and they all must be tracked for sepsis management. In other words, it is not
simply sufficient to represent all these changes by an aggregated degree of insufficiency. On the other
hand, clinical information regarding some other organs, such as respiratory and kidney systems, are
aggregated as the degree of insufficiency.
At this stage, we must determine the concurrency level of our sepsis model. According to G3, the
affected physiological functions that need to be tracked simultaneously must be modeled by separate
finite state machines. IfG2 has already been applied, following this guideline becomes straightforward.
Previously, we specified the different (aggregated) pathophysiological states need to be tracked for a
septic patient. To keep track of all these states and prevent any critical changes from being overlooked
we model each process using a separate state machine. These state machines are show in Figure 4.2,
which demonstrate the result of applying the modeling guidelinesG1 -G3.
Now, must define the states for each of the identified pathophysiological state machines. As shown
in 4.1, sequential organ failure assessment (SOFA) score is used to represent how and to what degree
each organ function is affected [60]. The scores are calculated based on the current values of the
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Figure 4.3: Sequential Organ Failure Assessment
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Figure 4.4: Respiratory Insufficiency State Machine
corresponding SOFA variable(s).
However, defining a large number of states can make the model very complex and unmanageable.
In guideline G4, we introduced the notions of actionable states. Not all the changes in physiological
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Figure 4.5: Sepsis State Machine
measurements are relevant or useful for a given disease. We define a new state when there is a need for
new monitoring and therapeutic plan. The actionable states for sepsis can be directly extracted from the
SOFA table shown in Figure 4.3. The minimum SOFA score is 0, which indicate the normal function.
The maximum score is 4 indicating severe insufficiency in the corresponding organ function. Therefore,
for the pathophysiological state machines that use SOFA score as the their state variables, we define
five states, one for each SOFA score. Figure 4.4 shows respiratory insufficiency state machine, as an
example.
After defining the states, we must identify the correct and optimal number of transitions by consid-
ering the underlying medical knowledge. According to guideline G5, when continuous physiological
variables, such as SOFA scores, are used to define different states, the transitions are only defined to
represent the progress of insufficiency. We only define an edge between the states that represent gradual
deterioration and improvement. Figure 4.4 shows this guidelines is applied to respiratory insufficiency
state machine. As mentioned before, the initial state is the exception, since patient state is not know at
the start.
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Figure 4.6: Sepsis Model Interaction Diagram
Following the last guideline, G6, we do not define any interaction between different pathophysio-
logical state machines. We codify the potential interactions a sepsis disease model, as shown in Figure
4.5. The sepsis state machine codifies the different stages of sepsis, starting with potential infection.
The information from different pathophysiological processes are aggregated in this machine. Figure
4.6 shows the interaction diagram for the sepsis model. We try to minimize any communication or
dependency between the pathophysiological machines. This improves the model modularity. The com-
plexity of validation and verification may be reduced since most of pathophysiological state machines
can be validated and verified independently of the others.
4.1.1 Sepsis Guideline Model
The guideline model must encode the relevant clinical data, that is best practice monitoring and
treatment guidelines organized for different pathophysiological and disease states. We use the notion
of actionable alerts, which follows the same line of reasoning as actionable states, which was describe
in Section 2.3. In fact, by encoding the alerts on patient state changes in already defines actionable
states we ensure that they are comprehensive and integrated with pathophysiological sates. These
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alerts may also be issued on patient’s response to treatments or best practice treatment option for the
current pathophysiological states.
The alerts on development or resolution of organ insufficiency states are encoded in individual patho-
physiological states. These alerts only depend on the information from the corresponding pathophysio-
logical process. There are no interaction between different pathophysiological processes and therefore
these alerts can be encoded independent of each other. For example, the alert indicating patient has
developed moderate renal insufficiency is encoded in the renal state machine.
However, the alerts on progress of the sepsis is encode in the state state machine. These alerts require
information from several pathophysiological processes. This aggregated information is encoded in
sepsis state machine, which is the best place to encode this category of alerts. The alert indicating a
septic patient has deteriorated to septic shock is an example alert from this category. The alert messages,
in general, has the following main items:
• The new sepsis/pathophysiological state (and the corresponding process).
• pathophysiological state change type: improvement or deterioration.
• The current value of relevant measurements.
• The normal range for each of the above measurements.
• Recommended treatment and monitoring actions.
Figure 4.7 shows the alert message when sepsis is detected. The information presented in an alert
message is added and displayed permanently in a history table on the system’s user interface.
Figure 4.7: Respiratory Insufficiency Alert Message
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Figure 4.8: Sepsis Guidance System Integration and Data Flow
4.2 Model Integration
We have developed the initial version of our model-based sepsis guidance system (we only have
one version vs. the two versions of cardiac arrest guidance systems). Figure 4.8 shows the system
integration process as well the data flow between the sepsis models and the guidance. As described
in Section 2.6, we use the modeling tool Yakindu and we have developed a communication interface
that allows the sepsis Yakindu models to communicate with the guidance system Java code. The model
integration also provides a more user-friendly environment for simulation of different clinical scenarios.
This would allow physicians to validate the correctness of developed models more efficiently.
All the physiological measurements and relevant lab values can be entered through the guidance
system user interface and then communicated to sepsis models using our hand-written communication
code. The pathophysiological and sepsis state machines are updated when new clinical data becomes
available, to represent patient current state. A new set of alert messages may be generated as a result of
updated patient organ and disease state. Alerts generated by the model are sent to the guidance system
to be displayed foe medical staff. Figure 4.9 shows a snapshot of sepsis guidance system simulation
displaying an alert message indicating the deterioration of respiratory insufficiency state.
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Figure 4.9: Sepsis Guidance System Simulation
4.3 Remaining Challenges
Identifying at-risk patients as early as possible while maintaining a reasonable monitoring cost, is
critical for effective sepsis screening and management. Performing frequent monitoring of all patients
suspected of sepsis is not feasible and cost-effective. Therefore, it is critical to identify the patients at a
higher risk of sepsis and perform more extensive and frequent monitoring only for this class of patients.
As part of our future work, we plan on developing a risk driven sepsis model encoding dynamic
Bayesian analysis in different pathophysiological states. Using the calculated risk values at each state,
we can then adapt the extent and frequency of monitoring accordingly. In states with higher degree
of insufficiency, the medical staff may require to monitor more frequently and/or monitor more rele-
vant measurements. These guidelines may be then encoded in the corresponding pathophysiological
state. If integrated in the guidance system, such a model can provide risk driven sepsis screening and
management.
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4.4 Research Publications
Following is the published research paper on our initial findings on the use of state-based Bayesian
networks to improve the efficiency of high-risk patient identification:
• Jiang, Yu, Lui Sha, Maryam Rahmaniheris, Binhua Wan, Mohammad Hosseini, Pengliu Tan,
and Richard B. Berlin Jr. ”Sepsis Patient Detection and Monitor Based on Auto-BN” Journal of
medical systems 40, no. 4 (2016): 1-10. [73]
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Chapter 5
MD PnP: Device Configuration Safety
5.1 Organ-Centric Device Configuration Management
Medical systems need to inherently be run-time configurable. In acute care environments, the patient
condition can change rapidly and this may result in a dynamic clinical environment. The safety and
efficacy of patient care in such dynamic environment depend on continuously safe use of medical
monitoring and therapeutic devices. For instance, SpO2 readings (saturation of peripheral oxygen)
in a patient with circulatory shock are faulty and must be disregarded. Moreover, attaching the blood
pressure cuff and oximeter on the same upper limb causes faulty SpO2 readings when the cuff is
inflated. This is necessary since the use of faulty measurements prevents correct assessment of patient
condition and endangers patient safety. Another example is a patient with acute lung injury, who
requires a ventilator as part of her/his therapeutic intervention.
The examples mentioned above, represent changes in cardiovascular and pulmonary organ states.
Insufficinecy Category Organ Insufficinecy States
Disturbed Blood Flow Limb Ischemia, Cardiac Ischemia
Blood Pressure Dysregulation Hypertension, Hypotension, Excessive & Maladaptive Fluctuation
Blood Gas Imbalance Alkalosis, Acidosis, Hypercapnia, Hypocapnia, Hypoxemia
Cardiac Arrhythmia Pulseless Ventricular Tachycardia (Pulseless V-Tach), Ventricular Fibrillation (V-Fib),
Pulseless Electrical Activity (PEA), Asystole
Table 5.1: The Cardiovascular Organ Insufficiency States
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As a result of such changes in the organ states, new devices may be plugged in or an existing device
may be removed from clinical configuration. In fact, different organ states require different monitor-
ing and therapeutic device configurations. Medicine is organized according to human organ systems.
Each organ system performs a certain task in the body. Different diseases, can impair one or more of
the physiological functions performed by the organ system. The pathophysiology of an organ system
would describe how each of the functions are affected by different diseases. For example, the circula-
tory shock is a cardiovascular disease, which impairs the blood flow in the limbs. Impairment of the
blood flow in the limbs is considered a cardiovascular insufficiency state while circulatory shock is a
disease causing the insufficiency. Understanding the pathophysiology of an organ system is key to ef-
ficient management of monitoring and therapeutic medical devices. We propose a device configuration
management approach that apply the proposed organ-centric disease patient model to systematically
structure device configuration rules. Moreover, it is necessary to trigger the correct configuration re-
quirements as the acute care environment changes. We have also developed the UPPAAL model of the
organ-centric device configuration management system and verified a set of safety properties against
the model.
We use the cardiac arrest case study to explain our approach. The cardiovascular system consists of
the heart and blood vessels. The main responsibility of this organ system is to support blood circulation
to provide nutrients, oxygen, etc. to different parts of the human body. Another task performed by this
organ system is to support the CO2 and O2 exchanges in the lungs that stabilize blood PH , which is
the measure of acidity of the blood. We can categorize the different pathophysiological states of the
cardiovascular organ system into four main insufficiencies. The first category represent the conditions,
in which the blood flow is blocked or partially blocked. This can be the result of different cardiovas-
cular disease such as blood clot, hardening and narrowing of the artery, peripheral artery disorder or
circulatory shock. The second category represents the abnormalities in heart rhythm, which leads to
significant drop of cardiac output and impairs blood circulation. The insufficient blood circulation in
the lungs to perform the CO2 and O2 exchange results in CO2 accumulation in the blood and causes
a rise in blood PH level. This plays an important role in our case study on cardiac arrest. Abnormal
blood gas levels and dysregulated blood pressure are the third and fourth categories. Table 5.1 shows a
subset of cardiovascular states relevant to the intelligent management of devices. We have verified this
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abstract model of cardiovascular insufficiency states with the physician, who collaborates closely with
our research group.
5.2 Monitoring and Therapeutic Configuration Safety
In this section, we consider a subset of device configuration safety constraints, commonly enforced
in cardiac arrest scenario by medical staff. First, we describe the rules as they are taught and used
clinically.
Conditional use of measurements and monitoring devices We describe two example rules of this
type used in cardiac arrest scenario. For a patient with circulatory shock:
• R1: Oximeter and blood pressure cuff must not be used.
• R2: Central venous catheter must be used to measure blood pressure and oxygenation.
Inter-Device Interference Such interferences can be either direct or indirect. To illustrate the use of
patient states, we focus on the indirect interferences that involves human physiology:
• R3: When the oximeter and blood pressure cuff are attached to the same upper limb the SpO2
readings, saturation of peripheral oxygen, must be discarded when the cuff is inflated.
Conditional use of therapeutic devices and intravenous medications Misuse of treatment devices
and inappropriate administration of medications can lead to an unsafe state. For instance, for a cardiac
arrest patient:
• R4: Defibrillator must not be used for non-shockable rhythms.
• R5: Epinephrine must be given to a patient with non-shockable rhythm.
• R6: Epinephrine is not effective for a cardiac arrest patient with low blood pH level. Bicarbonate
must be given to the patient for Epinephrine to be effective.
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Name Physiology Monitor Type Current Reading
BP Blood Pressure Blood Pressure Cuff 80 mmHg
SpO2 Peripheral Oxygen Saturation Oximeter 95%
Pulse Pulse Rate Oximeter 100 bpm
HR-EKG Heart Rate EKG Machine 95 bpm
CO2 Exhaled Carbon Dioxide Capnometer 50%
CVP Central Venous Pressure Central Venous Catheter 80 mmHg
ScvO2 Central Venous Oxygen Saturation Central Venous Catheter 80%
Heart-Rhythm Heart Rhythm EKG Machine Ventricular Tachycardia
pH Arterial Blood Acidity Arterial Blood Gas Test 7.2
Table 5.2: Measurement Model and Example Instantiations
• R7: For the acidosis patient, calcium chloride (CaCl2) should not be administered in the same
infusion or venous point as sodium bicarbonate (NaHCO3). Due to a chemical interaction,
calcium will combine with sodium bicarbonate to form an insoluble precipitate [74].
It is important to note that the issue of potential side effects and adverse interaction of medications is
quite complex and outside the scope of this paper [75]. In this paper, we only consider a subset of safety
requirements concerning medications, which ICU physicians ask our system to monitor at runtime.
The minimum optimal set of actuators and measurements for a given patient state The example
rules for cardiac arrest state are:
• R8: The optimal therapeutic configuration includes ventilator, infusion pump, and defibrillator.
• R9: The optimal set of physiological measurements include blood pressure, blood oxygenation,
exhaled CO2 and heart electrical activity.
5.3 Modeling Device Configuration Safety
Now, we illustrate how these device and medication safety requirements can be organized more effi-
ciently by the introduction of explicit organ states. Each requirement in the previous section describes a
device or medication constraint which must be satisfied for a specific patient pathophysiological state.
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Name Monitor Type Availability Monitoring Status Body Part Measurement List
BPCuff Blood Pressure Cuff Available In Use Left Upper Limb {BP}
Oximeter Pulse Oximetery Available In Use Right Upper Limb {SpO2, Pulse}
cvCatheter Central Venous Catheter Available Not In Use Subclavian Vein {ScvO2, CVP}
EKG EKG Machine Available In Use Chest {Heart Rhythm}
ABG-Test Arterial Blood Gas Test Not Available Not In Use - {pH, paCO2, paO2}
Table 5.3: Monitoring Device Model and Example Instantiations
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Figure 5.1: Arrhythmia State Machine Focused on Cardiac Arrest Scenario
The patient state can be represented by a combination of organ states. We call the first element of each
requirement ”organ state predicate” and the second element ”configuration predicate”.
In this paper, we assume each device configuration for a common patient state is standardized based
on generally accepted medical principles. A configuration for a given patient state is the combination
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Figure 5.2: Ischemia State Machine
of monitoring and therapeutic configurations. The monitoring configuration refers to the set of all
commonly used monitoring devices and their corresponding attributes. The therapeutic configuration
represents the set of medical actuators and IV (intravenous) medications for a given patient state. We
use a unified model for medical devices, physiological measurements, and IV medications. Each of the
specific fields or attributes of the elements in the model are accessed and used to describe and evaluate
the safety constraints. For instance, the monitoring device model includes the body part where the
device is attached to, and the monitoring status indicating whether the measurements generated by the
device are being used. Tables 5.2 and 5.3 show examples of measurement and monitoring device model
instantiations. Actuator and medication model instantiations are not presented due to space limitation;
however, most of the chosen attributes for these models are self-describing.
Each of the main categories of organ state insufficiencies is realized in an individual state machine.
Figures 5.1, 5.2, and 5.3 show the state machines of cardiac arrhythmia, ischemia, and blood gas
imbalance (BGI) categories, respectively. Each machine is a labeled transition system. The nodes in
each machine represent different organ states in the corresponding category. The gray circles represent
the states, in which the configuration safety is re-evaluated. The clinical events, such as a new diagnosis,
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Figure 5.3: Gas Imbalance State Machine
change of a device status or administration of a new medication, trigger the transition to these states.
The transition between the states are labeled with guards and actions. A guard is a boolean expres-
sion, and the transition labeled with a guard can be enabled when the guard evaluates to true. The
action must be performed when the transition is enabled. The transition links may also be labeled with
communication actions. In state machine language, c? and c! represent the send and receipt actions on
the communication channel c, respectively. For example, in our system, the transition between different
organ states happens according to the physician diagnosis. For example, when the patient is diagnosed
with acidosis, the physician interface machine communicates this information by sending New BGI
Diagnosis! to Gas Imbalance state machine. The receipt of this diagnosis information is indicated
by the outgoing edges from Normal state in figure 5.3, which are labeled with New BGI Diagnosis?
communication action.
As mentioned above, the device configuration safety requirements often depend on the organ insuf-
ficiency states rather than diseases. Therefore, the detailed disease information can be encapsulated.
For example, when physician diagnoses the patient with circulatory shock, the disease is abstracted
away in the ischemia state model and is hidden from the rest of organ insufficiency machines. This is
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done by defining Get-New-Diagnosis(Ischemia) function. This function checks the value of Ischemia-
Diagnosis set by the physician. If the diagnosis refers to any of the diseases causing limb ischemia,
such as circulatory shock, it returns Limb Ischemia. The information regarding the relation between
diseases and organ insufficiencies must come from the physician. We only encode the information
given by the physician.
5.3.1 Encoding Safety Checks in Organ Insufficiency Machines
At each point during system operation, only a subset of configuration safety requirements must be
monitored. These are the requirements, which are encoded in the state(s) representing the current
patient condition. For example, for a cardiac arrest patient with asystole rhythm and low blood pH ,
cardiac dysrhythmia and blood gas imbalance state machines would be in Asystole and Acidosis states,
respectively. The requirements R4, R5, R6, R8, and R9 must be encoded in Asystole state and R7
must be encoded in Acidosis state. These requirement would be the only requirements to monitor for
the given patient condition.
The requirement R6 contains two different patient states. Since cardiac arrest is the primary con-
dition we encode this requirement in the corresponding states in arrhythmia machine. However, we
must add an interaction point between arrhythmia and BGI machines at the appropriate states. This is
explained in the next subsection.
Now, we take a closer look at the requirements we need to encode in different organ states for the
cardiac arrest scenario. Let’s consider the patient condition in R1 and R2 that describes a disease,
in which the blood flow to peripherals are disturbed. As mentioned above, this is a cardiovascular
insufficiency state known as limb ischemia. This state interferes with the correct operation of blood
pressure cuff and oximeter, which depends on non-disturbed blood flow in the upper limbs. Therefore,
we encode the requirements on correct operation of blood pressure cuff and pulse oximetery in Limb
Ischemia state in Ischemia state machine. This is encoded by adding two functions Check-Oximeter-
Precondition() and Check-BPCuff-Precondition() to the action item of the transition to Limb Ischemia
state.
For cardiovascular conditions, blood pressure and oxygenation must be monitored continuously
since they are basic indicators of cardiovascular functions in the body. Therefore, when patient state
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indicates limb ischemia monitoring devices other than oximeter and blood pressure cuff, such as central
venous catheter, must be used to measure blood pressure and oxygen saturation. This is encoded by
defining the third function checking the availability of Check-Availability(cvCatheter). These functions
would also be used to re-evaluateR1 andR2 when any event relevant to these requirements happen.
The blood flow can also be disturbed by a medical device. The blood pressure cuff disturbs the
blood flow on the upper limb when the cuff is inflated. Therefore, according to R3, if the oximeter
is attached to the same upper limb as the cuff is attached, the organ state precondition for validity of
blood oxygenation, measured by the oximeter, is violated. These are encoded in Right Upper Limb
Ischemia and Left Upper Limb Ischemia states in Ischemia state machine. We define Check-Oximeter-
Precondition() function to check for any potential interference. This is the only case, in which we
transition to a new organ state without any signal from physician. When blood pressure cuff is in use
and we are in Normal state we transition to one of Upper Limb Ischemia states depending on the body
part, to which the cuff is attached.
The requirement R4  R6 is encoded in PEA and Asystole states and is checked using Check-
Defibrillator-Precondition() function. In our model, the requirement R7 is encoded in Acidosis state
in BGI machine. Although this requirement is related to a chemical reaction of two medication inde-
pendent of patient state, in our cardiac arrest scenario we choose to encode it in a state, where one or
both of these medications are potentially used as part of treating the corresponding organ insufficiency.
This follows our unified model while ensuring the safety requirement is encoded properly. We define
function Check-NaHCO3-CaCl2-Interference() to check this requirements whenever needed.
We define Check-Measurement-Configuration() and Check-Actuator-Configuration() functions to
checkR8 andR9. These requirements must be encoded in all of the four cardiac arrest states: Asystole,
PEA, Pulseless VTach, and VFib. For the actuators, we only require their availability. The actuating sta-
tus is adapted dynamically according to organ states. The rules describing the required measurements
do not specify a monitoring device.The two functions added to the action element of the transitions
from Normal state to any of these four states. When we are in one of these states, these requirements
would be re-evaluated when there is a change in device configuration.
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5.3.2 Modeling the Interactive Safety Requirements
The next logical step is to identify and model any dependencies or interactions between these set
of requirements. Note that the there is a common element in the configuration constrain of R5 and
R6, which is the medication epinephrine. According to AHA, ”high-dose epinephrine may improve
coronary perfusion and increase vascular resistance to promote initial return of spontaneous circulation
during CPR” [76]. However, epinephrine can also lead to transient respiratory acidosis and decrease in
blood pH level [77]. In a patient with already low blood pH , this effect can be exacerbated.
To model such interactive or potentially conflicting requirements in state machine language, we add
a synchronization point to the involved states. In this case, the interaction between R5 and R6, as
described above, is encoded in non-shockable cardiac arrest state which include PEA and Asystole.
Therefore, we add a synchronization point to PEA and Asystole states. When a new diagnosis for
BGI is received, which indicated acidosis, this requirements is re-evaluated by calling the function
Check-Epinephrine-Precondition().
Defining these synchronization points results in a well-defined interface between different organ
state machines and limits the their interactions to these predefined points. However, we should note
that there might be other type of dependency relations between medical rules, which may require a
different choice of modeling. This is a topic of future work.
Having the organ insufficiency state machines for the cardiac arrest case with encoded safety re-
quirements in the relevant states, configuration safety can be validated as the environment and patient
condition changes. The definition of safety check functions described above are shown in pseudocodes
2, 3, 4 and 5. The global variable Ri-Violated indicates whether the corresponding requirement is
violated or not. The definition of some of the simpler functions are not shown due to space limitations.
5.4 Formal Verification of Device Configuration Safety Model
We follow the approach explained in section 5.3 to encode the rules and safety evaluation algorithm
in each organ state automaton. The only difference is that the organ state automaton immediately
transition back from the violation states after updating the appropriate V iolation variables. This is
to ensure that the automata are in the states, which can synchronously receive the configuration and
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Pseudocode 2 Check-Required-Measurements(Diagnosis)
1
2 Boolean Oxygen Available = FALSE;
3 Boolean BP  Available = FALSE;
4 Boolean Heart Rhythm Available = FALSE;
5 R9  Violated = FALSE;
6
7 IF Diagnosis 2 Arrhythmia THEN
8 IF (9 monitor m where ((m.Availability == Available) AND (m.MonitoringStatus == InUse) AND (SpO2 2
m.MeasurementList OR ScvO2 2m.MeasurementList))) THEN
9 Oxygen Available = TRUE;
10 END IF;
11 IF (9 monitor m where ((m.Availability == Available) AND (m.MonitoringStatus == InUse) AND (BP 2
m.MeasurementList OR CV P 2m.MeasurementList))) THEN
12 BP  Available = TRUE;
13 END IF;
14 IF (9 monitor m where ((m.Availability == Available) AND (m.MonitoringStatus == InUse) AND (
Heart Rhythm 2m.MeasurementList)))THEN
15 Heart Rhythm Available = TRUE;
16 END IF;
17 IF ((Oxygen Available == TRUE) AND (BP  Available == TRUE) AND
18 (Heart Rhythm Available == TRUE)) THEN
19 R9  Violated = FALSE;
20 END IF;
21 END IF;
patient state change signals and immediately evaluate the current enforced rules and elect the new set
of rules to be enforced.
As mentioned in the previous section, the transition between different organ states are enabled by the
physician’s diagnosis. Figures 5.6 show the physician automata which is responsible for sending the
Diagnosed? and Resolved? synchronization signals for different organ states automata. We show the
oximeter and blood pressure cuff automata, as examples of device automata, in figure 5.7. Notice, we
have defined broadcast synchronization channels, whose senders are the devices. This ensures that any
change in device configuration is communicated synchronously to other organ state automata. Similar
channels are defined in the infusion pump automaton for different intravenous medications.
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Pseudocode 3 Check-Oximeter-Precondition()
1
2 R3  Violated = FALSE;
3 IF Oximeter.BodyPart == BPCuff.BodyPart THEN
4 R3  Violated = TRUE;
5 END IF;
6 IF (Get New  Diagnosis(Ischemia) == LimbIschemia) THEN
7 R3  Violated = TRUE;
8 END IF;
9 IF ((Get New  Diagnosis(Ischemia) == RightUpperLimbIschemia) AND (Oximeter.BodyPart ==
RightUpperLimb)) THEN
10 R3  Violated = TRUE;
11 END IF;
12 IF ((Get New  Diagnosis(Ischemia) == LeftUpperLimbIschemia) AND (Oximeter.BodyPart ==
LeftUpperLimb)) THEN
13 R3  Violated = TRUE;
14 END IF;
Pseudocode 4 Check-Epinephrine-Precondition()
1 R5  Violated = FALSE;
2 R6  Violated = FALSE;
3 IF ((Get New  Diagnosis(BGI) ==Normal) AND (Epi.AdministerationStatus ==NotAdminstered)) THEN
4 R5  Violated = TRUE;
5 END IF;
6 IF ((Get New  Diagnosis(BGI) == Acidosis) AND (Epi.AdministerationStatus == Adminstered)) THEN
7 R6  Violated = TRUE;
8 END IF;
Pseudocode 5 Check-NaHCO3-CaCl2-Interference()
1 R7  Violated = FALSE;
2 IF ((NaHCO3.AdministerationStatus == Adminstered) AND (CaCl2.AdministerationStatus == Adminstered)
AND (NaHCO3.InfusionPump == CaCl2.InfusionPump)) THEN
3 R7  Violated = TRUE;
4 END IF;
The ischemia model is presented in figures 5.2. Notice Rules 1-3 are encoded in limb ischemia
state. The ischemia automata communicates with other organ states including cardiac dysrhythmia
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Figure 5.4: Ischemia Automaton
using ischemiaDiagnosed and ischemiaResolved channels. The interface between the ischemia
state and other organ states are well-defined and is limited to only ischemia diagnosis and resolution
signals. Special cases of upper limb ischemia caused by blood pressure cuff is also modeled in ischemia
automata.
The cardiac dysrhythmia automaton is shown in 5.5. The Rules 4, 6 are encoded in the non-
shockable cardiac arrest state and Rule 5 is encoded in shockable cardiac arrest state. Rules 8, 9
are encoded in all cardiac arrest states. When the automaton transitions to a different state the enforced
set of rules are updated automatically since the rules are encoded in each state. For example, when
the non-shockable cardiac arrest state is entered the rule preventing the activation of defibrillator is
added automatically since Rule 4 is encoded in this state. When an organ state encoded in a different
automaton is diagnosed or resolved the corresponding signal is communicated to cardiac dysrhythmia
automaton which triggers the re-evaluation of the currently enforced rules. For example in any of the
cardiac arrest states, receiving limbIscemiaResolved? results in re-evaluation of Rules 9.a, 9.b and
checking the availability of oximeter and blood pressure cuff. The changes in device configuration are
communicated synchronously as well using the corresponding broadcast channels. Rules 7 is encoded
in the acidosis state in the blood gas imbalance automaton (not shown due to space limitation). Next,
we describe several examples of properties verified by UPPAAL tool.
5.4.1 Properties
We verified the absence of deadlock and reachability of all the states in the model. In addition, a set
of properties, indicating that any violation of the defined safety rules are always detected, has been also
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Figure 5.5: Cardiac Dysrhythmia Automaton
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(not cvCatheter.inUse and limbIschemia)    > ischemiaSafetyViolated
(oximeter.inUse and limbIschemia)    > ischemiaSafetyViolated
(bpCuff.inUse and limbIschemia)    > ischemiaSafetyViolated
(bpCuff.inUse and oximeter.inUse and (oximeter.bodyPart == bpCuff.bodyPart))   > oximeterPreconditionViolated
Table 5.4: Examples of Verified Safety Properties
Figure 5.6: Physician Automaton
verified. A set of example properties are presented in table 5.4. The properties are of the form leads to
or in other words response properties written as ↵    >   in UPPAAL tool. This properties are read
as whenever ↵ is satisfied, then eventually   will be satisfied [78]. As can be seen from table 5.4, the
proposed rule structure and evaluation algorithm ensure that violation of any of the defined safety rules
are always detected.
We should also note that in [79], we proposed a well-defined interface between different organ au-
tomata and limited the their interactions to a set of predefined points. However, this can decrease the
modularity of our organ-based modeling approach; if there is the need for a modification of an organ
model, all the other organ models, which have any interaction with the modified model, must be modi-
fied as well. Therefore, in [80], we move to a more modular approach by developing a central manager
and encapsulating the interaction between different organ automata within the central manager. The
models presented in this chapters are developed according to the modular approach.
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Figure 5.7: Pulse Oximeter and Blood Pressure Cuff Automata
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Chapter 6
MD PnP: A Framework for the Safe
Analysis
One goal of the Medical Device Plug-and-Play (MD PnP) program is the adoption of medical device
interoperability to significantly mitigate preventable medical errors by developing the technological
foundation to design the next generation medical systems. The ”Patient-Centric Integrated Clinical En-
vironment” (ICE) standard is one such development, which is described in ASTM 2761-09(2013) [50].
This standard describes the logical elements of an MD PnP system but does not specify implementation
details.
A MD PnP system supports a range of safe medical system configurations, where medical devices
are ”plugged in” as needed, information from different sources are integrated, and medical actions
are coordinated to provide an integrated clinical environment. An ICE typically consists of an ICE
supervisor, an ICE network controller, ICE device interface and etc. The MD PnP system described
in this report follows a similar structure and therefore MD PnP and ICE may be used interchangeably
when describing different components of an integrated medical system.
To facilitate the development of medical device interoperability, the MD PnP program has developed
an open source implementation of the Integrated Clinical Environment and made it freely available on
SourceForge [51]. The platform consists of software device adapters for medical devices (including
anesthesia machines, ventilators, and patient monitors), Object Management Group (OMG) Data Dis-
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tribution Service (DDS) for Real-Time systems standard middle-ware, and demonstration applications.
The choice of the MD PnP platform, namely, the computers, OS, and network, is up to the user. There
are no approved platforms by any agency that support plug and play. This is because plug and play
could generate new configurations not considered during the approval process. Unverified new con-
figurations of platform may or may not work, hence, the need for assurance of life cycle attributes.
Furthermore, all existing commercial platforms include a disclaimer indicating that these platforms are
not designed to be used for safety critical systems and applications.
This document provides guidelines to assist users to safely use an MD PnP system consisting of a
commercial platform not designed for safety critical applications. TheMD PnP system is said to be safe
for an intended medical application, if none of the MD PnP components can become a causal factor of
the known safety hazards when the medical devices are functioning according to their specifications.
In the next section, we present an overview of the MD PnP system components and the safety
requirements for each component. Before discussing safety analysis, a brief introduction on fault trees
is provided in Section 6.2. In Section 6.3, we present the safety analysis procedure used in this report;
two different approaches to ensure open-loop safety1 of the MD PnP system are introduced in this
section. Next, we study the safety of six clinical scenarios including airway laser surgery, laparoscopic
cholecystectomy and four clinical scenarios provided by the MD PnP program (Section 6.4). The
examples are used to illustrate the four steps in our safety analysis procedure. Finally, after studying
the examples, we discuss a generic version of our safety analysis approach in Section 6.5.
6.1 The MD PnP System Overview
In this section, we first look at the overall architecture of the MD PnP medical system and the
associated safety requirements.
6.1.1 Overall System Architecture
As shown in Figure 6.1, the MD PnP system consists of four parts: 1) medical device 2) MD PnP
device adapter, which allows the medical device to interface with the MD PnP system 3) MD PnP
1The definition of open-loop safety is presented in Section 6.3.
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Figure 6.1: MD PnP System Overview
clinical application and 4) the MD PnP middleware that supports the communication and interoperabil-
ity of medical devices 2. In this report, we refer to the combination of computing platform (OS and
microprocessor) and the MD PnP middleware as theMD PnP platform.
Note that the medical devices do not communicate directly with each other. In an ideal world, there
would be well accepted standards on syntax and semantic for device communication. Currently legacy
devices from different manufacture may provide different communication paradigm. The MD PnP
middleware provides a uniform format to clinical application designers for interacting with medical
devices. We assume all the MD PnP devices use the same interface description language (IDL) [84].
The middleware then translates the uniform format to specific device data and metadata format. In this
way, the complexity of heterogeneous devices will be hidden from the applications and encapsulated
by the MD PnP middleware.
The translation and mapping of setting from medical devices to clinical applications must be verified
to be correct for the intended clinical use. In the following, we shall assume that developers have done
so correctly.
The MD PnP middleware runs on top of commercial computing and communication equipment,
which are not designed for safety critical applications. Hence, we need to consider their failure modes
and the safety impacts on the intended medical applications.
2Interoperability refers to the ability to seamlessly connect individual devices from different vendors into integrated
medical systems [49].
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6.1.2 Safety Requirements
MD PnP systems, using dependable commercial platforms with sufficiently long mean time to fail-
ure, can be used safely, provided that 1) the MD PnP system will only be used as an advisory system
and its output does not directly control any safety critical medical devices 2) the outputs will only be
used to activate non-safety critical devices. Non-safety critical devices refer to the devices that their
operation cannot endanger patient safety, assuming the device functions according to its specification.
A safety-critical device is life-sustaining and can directly affect patient safety. Dependable platforms
with sufficiently long mean time to failure ensure high availability and improve the system usability.
However, the notion of safety criticality for a medical device can only be considered in the context of
the intended clinical use. Therefore a device may be considered a safety critical device in one clinical
procedure but non-safety critical in another. For example, the x-ray device in [57] is an example of
non-safety critical device; the inability of the device to take an x-ray image does not endanger the
patient, assuming the device functions as specified. On the other hand, if the x-ray image is used
in an emergency surgery to determine the exact surgical site, the x-ray device may be considered a
safety-critical device. Another example is a ventilator connected to a patient under anesthesia. If a
ventilator remains off for too long, brain damage may occur. Therefore, the ventilator is considered a
safety-critical device in this scenario since incorrect setting of this device can endanger patient safety.
In this report we focus on the MD PnP safety, which is a system property. However, the global
MD PnP safety itself depends on the operational safety of individual devices constituting the system.
Operational safety of medical devices is the union of local operational safety: when the device is
used alone it will not become a causal factor of a safety hazard fault tree, and interaction safety: the
interaction of two or more medical devices will not become a causal factor of a safety hazard in the
fault tree.
As an example let us consider the airway laser surgical scenario. The main devices of the MD PnP
system for this scenario include an oxygen controller and a surgical laser. To ensure local safety of the
oxygen controller the device must not be puased for too long that it causes brain hypoxia. However,
to ensure the safe interaction of the two devices in the context of airway laser surgery, where the laser
is applied to the oxygen pathway, the oxygen controller must be puased when the laser is activated
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to prevent fire. Interaction safety may create additional challenges, which must be addressed when
analyzing the safety of MD PnP systems.
In the next section, we discuss the requirements for the four main elements of the MD PnP systems,
when the system output is used to directly control safety critical devices.
Medical Device Requirements
There are two categories of safety requirements regarding medical devices. One category focuses on
design safety and the other involves operational safety.
Medical Device Design Safety: The concept of safety in medical device design has been broadened
from the simple, basic safety considerations to include essential performancematters [85]. As noted by
the recent editions of IEC 60601-13, safety standard for medical electrical equipment, many of medical
devices are life-sustaining or critical for correct diagnosis. A device which does not perform properly
can present an unacceptable risk, and hence endanger patient safety. For example, a defibrillator that
will not discharge may be considered unsafe. Similarly, incorrect diagnosis resulting from a monitoring
device malfunction can lead to unsafe or ineffective treatment.
According to this standard, ”basic safety provides protection against direct physical hazards when
medical electrical equipment is used under normal or other reasonably foreseeable conditions, (e.g. me-
chanical strength, leakage current and fire safety)” while, ”essential performance requirements limit or
establish critical parameters such as the frequency response of a diagnostic electrocardiograph and the
output energy of a cardiac defibrillator”, which presents an unreasonable risk should this performance
fail.
Within the scope of this study we assume medical devices function as specified and satisfy their
safety and essential performance requirements. To ensure safety of the MD PnP system when medical
devices are malfunctioning is a topic to be addressed in the future.
Medical Device Operational Safety: In addition to design safety, there is another aspect to medical
device safety, which is how to ensure operational safety of medical devices during the patient care
process. The operational safety constraints of medical devices are context dependent and may change
3The IEC (International Electrotechnical Commission) is a worldwide organization for standardization comprising all
national electrotechnical committees. IEC 60601-1 is the parent safety standard for medical electrical equipment.
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dynamically during the patient care process. The context refers to the information on the patient state,
status of all medical devices in the system, clinical procedure, etc. As explained in Section 6.1.2,
operational safety of medical devices is the union of local operational safety and device interaction
safety. In this report, we focus on operational safety of medical devices when analyzing the global
safety of the MD PnP systems.
Although we assume that the medical device design is safe and it satisfies the basic safety and
essential performance requirements, for a device to be operating as part of the MD PnP system, it must
also meet the following requirements:
• The device must provide the capability to be controlled and monitored.
• The device must be equipped with local display that shows the current device operational status
such as ventilation mode, infusion rate, medication dosage, etc. The device must also display
what component is controlling the device (ex: MD PnP through remote configuration panel, or
human operator through local control buttons). In other words, the locus of control must be clear.
The local display is specifically critical for manual execution of fail-safe steps for each device. In
addition, explicit notice for overwrite by human operator must be put on the device local display.
MD PnP Device Adapter Requirements
As described in the ICE standard, a legacy medical device must be equipped with an adapter to allow
the device to interface with the MD PnP middleware, so that the device can be under supervisory
control. The existing medical/ health device communication standards, such as ISO/IEEE 11073 [86],
[87], although necessary for designing medical device interfaces, are not sufficient when developing
ICE applications to control and coordinate devices.
We assume a crash failure semantic for this component, i.e. it can only fail by crashing. The
correctness of MD PnP device adapter must be verified to ensure that control or monitoring values
communicating through the adapter would not be altered. We discuss the case, in which the adapter
crashes, in later sections.
Since medical device adapters play a critical role in safe use of MD PnP systems, we are required
to discuss the dependability or reliability of this component, which describes its ability to function as
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specified under stated conditions for a specified period of time. The device adapter reliability affects the
open-loop safe solution that can be used for the MD PnP system. We discuss the details of open-loop
safety in Section 6.3. We consider two classes of reliability for the device adapters:
Highly Reliable: the device adapter must satisfy an appropriate meantime to failure (MTTF) require-
ment to ensure safety of an intended medical application:
• MTTF   NHighly Reliable ⇥Operation Window
where Operation Window denotes the maximum operation time for the intended clinical use and
NHighly Reliable represents the dependability requirement, which can also be adjusted for each clinical
procedure. For example, under the commonly used exponential reliability model4, NHighly Reliable =
1, 000, 000 implies one failure per million operations on average. This number should be sufficiently
high for the intended medical procedure, so that the benefit significantly outweighs the risk. Our design
for qualified safety critical components assumes that their probability of failure during the window of
operation is virtually zero.
Reliable: the device adapter must satisfy the following meantime to failure (MTTF) requirement:
• NReliablel ⇥Operation Window MTTF < NHighly Reliable ⇥Operation Window
where a lower number, perhaps, NReliable = 10, 000, is acceptable. In medical domain, the system re-
liability requirements depend on the intended clinical use. This is unlike the avionic domain, in which
fixed reliability values are often recommended by FAA.
MD PnP Platform Requirements
We call the combination of a computational platform and the MD PnP middleware the MD PnP plat-
form. We consider the following requirements:
4R(t) ⇠ Exp(  1MTTF/Operation Window )
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Data Transformation Correctness: MD PnP middleware logic must be verified. For example, the
syntax and semantic translation and mapping of settings of devices from different vendors must be
verified to be clinically correct before usage. In the following, we shall assume that designers have
done so correctly.
Data Integrity: This requirement ensures that the data and supervisory commands going through
the MD PnP platform, before being delivered to medical devices, would not be corrupted in a way that
cannot be detected.
It is the MD PnP system developer’s responsibility to validate these requirements. However, com-
mercial computational platforms and networks are not designed for safety critical applications. Hence,
we assume that they may crash at any instant. We will use the crash failure semantic for the MD PnP
platform in the safety analysis in the rest of this report.
It is quite common that commercial platform vendors issue software or firmware upgrades; designers
should not install upgrades without re-verifying the failure mode assumptions. For example, upgrades
can create backward compatibility issues and unintended bugs not considered in the initially assumed
failure modes for platform or MD PnP software. In cases the upgrades are applied and the assumptions
on failure semantic do not hold anymore, the safety analysis must be re-examined.
MD PnP Application Requirements
When the MD PnP system in used to directly control safety critical medical devices, it will be the
developer’s responsibility to ensure that the failure of the MD PnP system cannot be a causal factor of
safety hazards. We consider the following safety requirements:
Computational Correctness: For each MD PnP clinical application, the specification must be vali-
dated and the implementation correctness must be verified. For example, if the application implements
a safety interlock or computes closed loop control values, the specification of the intended capabilities,
fundamental use and desired outputs must be validated and the correctness of safety interlock or control
logic implementation must be verified.
Data Integrity: This requirement ensures that the MD PnP application does not perform unspecified
transformation or change measurements and status information received from medical devices in a way
that cannot be detected.
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Symbol Description
MD#PnP#Supervisor*is#
Unable#to#Coordinate#
Devices#
State Representation
MD#PnP#Pla(orm##
Crashes#
Event Representation
Table 6.1: Common Symbols in Extended Fault Tree
In rest of this report we will assume that developers have correctly verified these requirements.
However, the MD PnP platform and/or network may crash and cause the MD PnP application to crash
as well. Assuming that the computational correctness and data integrity requirements have been verified
by the developers, we only consider crash failure semantic for this MD PnP component.
Finally, an error-free safety analysis is seldom an easy task. The MD PnP program cannot be re-
sponsible for the correctness of safety analysis performed by designers. In the next section, we present
the general safety analysis procedure followed in this report. Before explaining the different steps of
safety analysis, however, we present a brief introduction on extended fault tree analysis.
6.2 Introduction to Fault Tree Analysis
To make this report self-contained, we review the main components of a fault tree in this section.
Fault tree analysis is a commonly used method to ensure no undesired event in the system can com-
promise the system-wide safety. We also use Fault Tree analysis to demonstrate the behavior of the
system, which leads to the hazardous and unsafe situations. Safety cannot be modeled by fault trees,
which are simply representations of causal chains. Therefore, we use extended fault tree (EFT), which
is the combination of classic fault trees and state/event semantics [88].
6.2.1 Extended Fault Tree Analysis
The main goal in extended fault tree analysis is adding the capability of expressing state depen-
dencies or temporal order of events. This is necessary to describe a system’s behavior and analyze
its reliability and safety-related issues. In the extended fault tree, there are two type of nodes, state
node and event node. Table 6.1 shows the common symbols of an event and a node of the fault tree
representation. States describe conditions that last over a period of time whereas events are sudden
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Gate Name Symbol Description
AND
Laser&
Remains&On& Ven-lator&is&Turned&On&
AND!
Surgical&Fire&
If a certain event happens while the system is in a given state, then
immediately after the output event happens.
AND AND!
Ven'lator-
is-Oﬀ-
Ven'lator-
Remains-Oﬀ-
MD-PnP-Supervisor-
is-Unable-to-
Control-Devices-
This gate has generalization semantic.
History AND History(AND(
…(
Medical(Staﬀ((
Become(Insensi9ve(to(Alarm(
False(
Posi9ve(
False(
Posi9ve(
False(
Posi9ve(
The output event occurs immediately after the last of its input events
has occurred, provided that all other input events have occurred be-
fore. The input events can occur at any order.
OR
Device&State&
Changes&
OR!
Pa2ent&State&
Changes&
Device&Conﬁgura2on&
Must&be&Updated&
Occurrence of any of the input events causes the output event to
occur.
OR
MD#PnP#Supervisor**
is#Unable#to#
Coordinate#Devices#
MD#PnP#System**
is#Unable#to#Create#a#Safe#
Therapeu:c#Conﬁgura:on#
MD#PnP#Device*
Adapter*Has#
Crashed##
OR! This gate has generalization semantic: The output state can be re-
garded as a collective alias for the input states.
UPON
Alarm&Fa(gue&&
UPON&
Medical&Staﬀ&&
Become&Insensi(ve&&
to&Alarm&
Upon is a converting gate; it models the passage from an event to a
state, which has the meaning of referring to the state after the event
has happened for the first time. The input is an event and output is a
state.
On Entering
Pump%is%Not%
Stopped%on%Time%
On%Entering%
MD%PnP%System'is%Unable%
to%Stop%the%Pump%%
On Entering is a converting gate; it models the passage from a state
to an event, which has the meaning of referring to the point in time
where the state is entered. The input is a state and output is an event.
Table 6.2: Gates Commonly Used in Extended Fault Tree
phenomena, including state transitions. In EFT, round rectangles represent states and solid bars denote
events. Directed edges with bold arrowheads mark the causal edges. Table 6.2 depicts the gates and
notations used in fault tree analysis in this report. More details about extended fault tree can be found
in [45], [44], and [88].
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Symbol Semantic
Highly''
Reliable'
Component(
Component Satisfies Safety-Critical Requirements
Non-Causal Directed Edge
Table 6.3: Symbols for Newly-Introduced Extended Fault Tree Components
6.2.2 Context-Aware Extended Fault Tree Analysis
We introduce two additional elements to extended fault tree to provide more contextual information.
The first one is the Highly Reliable Component. This elements represent a component in the system
that meets the reliability requirement as described in Section 6.1.2: its meantime to failure must be
much longer than the operational window so that the probability of failure is deemed to be sufficiently
low for the intended clinical use. The next element is a Non-Causal Directed Edge, which represent
the cases in which system component may crash but its failure is not a causal factor of safety hazard.
Including such components in fault tree analysis provides additional information on system behavior.
Without the new elements, absence of faulty states or events of a component in tree can mean either it
does not contribute to safety hazard, or the designer has missed considering the component in safety
analysis. Including highly reliable components and/or non-causal edges in the tree can provide more
details on the system design and the approaches taken by the designer to trim the tree or break the paths
to tree root. Introducing these elements also helps with evaluating the comprehensiveness of fault tree.
Table 6.3 presents the symbols used for the new components and their semantic.
6.3 Safety Analysis of the MD PnP Systems
In this document, we illustrate how to determine whether the planned MD PnP system usage is a
causal factor in the known safety hazards of a medical scenario. Should the MD PnP usage be a causal
factor of safety hazards, we provide guidelines to transform the configuration so that it is no longer a
causal factor. To ensure safe use of the MD PnP system, we follow a 4-step safety analysis procedure:
• S1: Enumerate the safety hazards of the medical scenario and draw the extended fault trees for
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Figure 6.2: Fault Sub-Tree for MD PnP Supervisory Loop Crash
each hazard.
• S2: Identify whether any MD PnP component is a causal factor of the hazards.
• S3: Recommend a fail-safe solution if anyMD PnP component is a causal factor of those hazards.
(without a fail-safe solution users may choose not to use the MD PnP system if the risks are not
outweighed by the benefits)
• S4: Redraw the extended fault tree for any possible fail-safe solution to ensure that the MD PnP
platform/network failure path to the root is removed.
The first and fourth step involve drawing fault trees for enumerated safety hazards of each clinical
scenario. In some cases, the trees can get complex, which makes them less readable. To prevent this
problem, we take a modular approach, in which we introduce sub-trees that can be re-used in several
fault tree analyses. When drawing the trees for different clinical scenarios we only show the root of
subtrees used and their number in a green bubble for the readers to refer back for more details. The
first subtree we present is shown in Figure 6.2 which represents the series of events leading to the MD
PnP supervisory loop crash. In the third step of safety analysis, we provide guidelines and open-loop
safe solutions to transform the system configuration so that no MD PnP component is a causal factor.
Open Loop Safety: During normal operation, medical devices are monitored and coordinated by the
supervisor. If either the supervisor or the communication network fails, the supervisory control loop is
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Figure 6.3: Automated Open-Loop Safe MD PnP System Overview
said to be open. By open loop safety, we mean that even if the supervisory loop opens, the MD PnP
system still cannot be a causal factor of a safety hazard. Note that there are long-term and near-term
open-loop safe solutions:
• The long-term solution requires device makers to support simple timed safety actions. Otherwise,
the MD PnP device adapter must provide such capability. In this case, the device adapter must
be highly reliable, for the open-loop safety solution to work. We call this approach Automated
Open-Loop Safety (see Section 6.3.1).
• The near-term solution for existing medical devices is to use a component which includes a
recording device and a watchdog timer to remind users to perform the timed safety actions. In
this case the medical device adapters must only be reliable; however this added component must
be highly reliable. The device adapter cannot be trusted to move the medical device into a safe
state when the supervisory loop fails. Hence, open loop safety protocols are designed to reliably
pass the control back to the medical staff. We call this approach Integrated Human Machine
(IHM) Open-Loop Safety (see Section 6.3.2).
6.3.1 Automated Open-Loop Safety
As shown in Figure 6.3, the automated open-loop safe MD PnP system consists of the following
components:
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Figure 6.4: IHM Open-Loop Safe MD PnP System Overview
Automated Open-loop safe supervisor: This supervisory logic is added to the application layer
and runs on top of the MD PnP platform. The commands received from the MD PnP supervisor go
through the open-loop safe supervisor before being sent to the medical devices. The commands are
decomposed into a sequence of timed actions, which ensure that the devices move to a safe state by
taking these actions when the supervisory loop is open. At any point during the communication of
these messages, the supervisory loop can become open due to network failure or crash of the MD PnP
platform. Note that this will not causes any safety hazards since no commands will be sent unless the
corresponding timed safety command has been sent successfully. This protocol is any-step safe.
Highly reliable medical device adapters: This component ensures the timed safety commands5
are executed by the device when the MD PnP supervisory loop is open. It is assumed that the MD PnP
device adapter is highly reliable; otherwise, automated open-loop safety cannot be guaranteed.
6.3.2 IHM Open-Loop Safety
As shown in Figure 6.4, the automated open-loop safe MD PnP system consists of the following
components:
Medical Failover Manager (MFM): This component must be highly reliable. It shall be a simple
and verifiably reliable storage and display device that stores and displays the commands sent by the MD
5A timed safety command is a command to execute a safety action at the expiration of a timer set by the application, e.g.,
resume ventilation in 30 seconds. An example is in Page 108.
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PnP supervisor. Similar to avionic systems, the capability of having a record of what the system has
been doing will have great safety and legal values. In addition, the MFM has a configurable watchdog
timer that will issue an alarm, should the MD PnP supervisor stop sending heartbeats to the MFM. Once
the alarm is sounded, medical staff can check the MFM and know what the most recent command is,
which may or may not be executed, and the recent history. This allows medical staff to take safety
actions in an informed way. The MFM component consists of 1) a highly reliable storage and display
device, 2) a watch dog timer and alarm, 3) an interface with the MD PnP system. If the supervisor fails
to deliver heart beats to the timer, an alarm will sound indicating that the MD PnP supervisory loop is
open.
Integrated HumanMachine (IHM) open-loop safety supervisor: In addition to the highly reliable
MFM, the near term solution includes a supervisory component, which is responsible for executing the
open-loop safety protocol steps. In this approach, we use timed alarms to ask medical staff to move the
system into a safe state, since we assume device adapters are not highly reliable and therefore cannot
be trusted to move the medical devices to safe states. The protocol includes the following steps:
• At each step, the IHM open-loop safety supervisor first sends the command (received from the
MD PnP supervisor) to the MFM and waits for an acknowledgment before sending the command
to the medical device. This way, when the MD PnP system crashes and the alarm sounds by
MFM, medical staff know the command history and the most recent command that the supervisor
attempted to execute, greatly facilitating the medical staff’s take over task. For commands that
will put the device into a transient safe state, the command should be annotated with the open loop
safe action that a staff should perform manually. For example, the ”pause” command sent to the
MFM is annotated as pause at time t, (to be followed by ”resume” command at t+30sec).
• After receiving an acknowledgment from the MFM, the IHM open-loop safety supervisor sends
the command to the medical device and waits for an acknowledge from the device. If an ac-
knowledgment is not received in time, an alarm will sound to let medical staff know that the
device is not responding.
Figure 6.5(a) shows the sub-tree for automated open-loop supervisory loop crash and Figure 6.5(b)
shows the sub-tree for IHM open-loop supervisory loop crash.
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Figure 6.5: Subtrees for Supervisory Loop Crash
We recommend the record keeping in general. An accurate record of what the MD PnP supervisor
has done will be invaluable for post operation analysis, especially settling disputes, if any. To this end,
MFM’s record system should be protected from tampering by unauthorized users.
In the next section, we illustrate how to use each open-loop safety approach to ensure that no MD
PnP component is a causal factor of known safety hazards in the context of several clinical scenarios.
6.4 MD PnP Clinical Scenarios
In this section, we study six clinical scenarios and demonstrate the process of safety analysis of
the MD PnP system using extended fault trees in each case. For more details on these scenarios refer
to [89], [90] and [91]. We assume for each scenario, the clinical application specifies what kind of
response it expects form each medical device. In other words, the device composition must be definitive
for each application.
6.4.1 Laparoscopic Cholecystectomy
A 32-year-old woman had a laparoscopic cholecystectomy (gall bladder removal) performed under
general anesthesia. At the surgeon’s request, a plain film x-ray was shot during a cholangiogram [bile
duct x-ray]. The anesthesiologist stopped the ventilator for the film. The x-ray technician was unable
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to remove the film because of its position beneath the table. The anesthesiologist attempted to help her,
but found it difficult because the gears on the table had jammed. Finally, the x-ray was removed, and
the surgical procedure resumed. At some point, the anesthesiologist glanced at the EKG and noticed
severe bradycardia. He realized he had never restarted the ventilator. The ventilator is typically stopped
for 20 to 60 seconds to prevent motion-induced blurring of the image. This patient ultimately expired.
[92].
There are two approaches to prevent the motion-induced blur in the x-ray. If we use the MD PnP
system to pause the ventilator, then the MD PnP system becomes safety critical and we will illustrate
how to ensure open-loop safety. An alternative, in which the MD PnP system does not need to be safety
critical [57], is suggested.
The supervisor uses information from the ventilator to decide when to trigger the x-ray. The syn-
chronization algorithm defines exactly how this decision is made according to respiratory cycle as a
function of pressure over time. The pressure increases until the end of inspiration (at time T after start
of breath), at which point it drops off quickly through expiration. There is usually a pause between the
end of exhalation and the start of the next breath. For this case study, we want to support taking an
x-ray when the lung was not moving significantly. This occurs when the patient is relatively still at the
peak of inspiration or between the end of expiration and the start of the next breath. An exposure is
possible if the time the patient is still exceeds the time needed for the exposure plus the latency between
triggering the x-ray and the actual exposure.
Under this approach, the MD PnP system is not safety critical because it does not send stop com-
mands to the ventilator, which is a safety-critical device. We recommend this approach whenever it is
applicable. However, should pausing the ventilator be needed and users want to use the the MD PnP
system to manage the pause directly, then the MD PnP system becomes safety critical. Since the MD
PnP supervisor sends commands directly to the safety critical ventilator, this case shall be subject to
the 4-step safety analysis process. The first step is to determine the safety hazard(s) in this scenario and
perform the fault tree analysis (S1).
Following the modular approach, we first present the subtree for the MD PnP therapeutic configu-
ration, subtree 3.1, in Figure 6.6(a). Next, we use this subtree to represent the series of fault events
and states regarding the main elements of the MD PnP system, which can contribute to brain damage
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Figure 6.6: Extended Fault Tree Analysis of Brain Damage in the MD PnP System
in Figure 6.6(b).
In theory, the supervisor can send an atomic command pause and then resume at time t, which
will be safe if the approved ventilator can execute atomic transactions. This is the preferred method.
However, currently ventilators can only execute simple commands such as turn on and turn off. Hence,
users may use pause command followed by a resume command later at time t. In this case, crash of
the MD PnP platform or the network opens up a path to the root of tree and leads to brain damage.
Moreover, any error in the MD PnP supervisory logic, which is responsible for coordinating the x-ray
and ventilator devices can lead to an unsafe ventilator configuration; this should be mitigated. The
dotted red lines on the extended fault tree indicates these paths (step S2).
To break such paths to the root and ensure system safety despite the failure of these components,
an open-loop safe approach is needed (step S3). Next, we present the automated and IHM open-loop
safety solutions for this clinical scenario.
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Automated Open-loop Safe Coordination of X-ray and Ventilator
In this section we present the automated open-loop safe approach to prevent crash of the MD PnP
supervisory loop to cause brain damage in the laparoscopic cholecystectomy scenario (step S3). When
the MD PnP supervisor intends to send a command to turn off the ventilator for a period of time,
a sequence of timed actions are sequentially sent by the open-loop safe supervisor. In this case, a
command to resume the ventilator at time t is sent before sending the command to turn off the ventilator.
The open loop safe protocol ensures that the timed safety command is received by the device before
sending the ”turn off” command. The ”turn off” command puts the ventilator in a transient safe state,
because if the ventilator remains off for too long, patient’s blood oxygen level can drop below the safe
threshold and brain damage may happen.
The commands for timed actions are sent over the network and received by the open-loop safety de-
vice adapter, since existing ventilators do not support timer based actions. When the ”resume ventilator
at time t” command is sent to the MD PnP device adapter, if the ventilator has timer capability then
the device adapter, which must be highly reliable, sets the device timer; otherwise, a timer is created
and set by the adapter, which triggers the automatic resumption of ventilator upon expiration. After
setting the timer (through either of the two approaches), an acknowledgment is sent to the open-loop
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Figure 6.8: Brain Damage Extended Fault Tree for Automated Open-Loop Safe MD PnP System
safe supervisor. At this point, when it is assured that a timer to resume the ventilator is set, the com-
mand to turn off the ventilation is sent. Figure 6.7 shows the sequence of messages exchanged among
the different components of the open-loop safe MD PnP system. The timer value in this example is
only a nominal value; in general, the timer value for different actions can be updated as more recent
information on patient state and status of medical devices become available.
At any point during the communication of these messages, the supervisory loop can become open
due to network failure or crash of the MD PnP platform. This will not causes a hazard since the
command to turn off the ventilator will not be sent unless the resume timer has been set successfully.
This protocol is any-step safe. If the ventilator device does not have a timer feature, the open-loop
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safe protocol depends on the MD PnP device adapter to set up the timer and perform the timed safety
action. In this case it is assumed that the MD PnP device adapters are highly reliable and meet the
safety-critical requirements; otherwise, open-loop safety cannot be guaranteed. We recognize that such
highly reliable adapters will not be available in the near term, hence an alternative ”medical staff in the
loop” safety solution is provided in the next section.
For the last step of our safety analysis procedure, we redraw the extended fault tree that can lead
to brain damage. Figure 6.8(b) shows the updated fault tree, which includes the unsafe therapeutic
configuration subtree for automated open-loop safe system, Subtree 3.2. This subtree, shown in Figure
6.8(a), indicates that the automated open loop safe supervisor may fail. However, the open loop safe
protocol is any-step safe by definition; the open-loop safe supervisor always ensures that the MD PnP
device has received the timed safety action before moving to a transient safe state. Moreover, the device
adapter is highly reliable. Therefore, if the supervisory loop becomes open the adapter will move the
device into a safe state. Assuming the initial configuration is safe, failure of supervisory loop at any
step of the handshaking protocol will not result in an unsafe configuration. The safe ventilator operation
is added as depicted by AND gate in Figure 6.8(b)), which results in removal of all paths to the root.
IHM Open-loop Safe Coordination of X-ray and Ventilator
Timed safety commands executed by highly reliablemedical device adapters to enable automated open
loop safety protocols is a preferred long term solution. However, highly reliable adapters may not be
on the market in the near future. A simple near term solution is to include a MFM in the MD PnP
system. Instead of depending on device adapters to move the system into an open-loop safe state, we
only require one highly reliable component, theMFM to remind medical staff to move the system into
an open loop safe state. With a highly reliable MFM, all the medical device adapters are only required
to be reliable. The MD PnP supervisor should follow the IHM protocol for sending commands to
the ventilator. The communication between ventilator and MD PnP supervisor in the laparoscopic
cholecystectomy scenario includes the following steps:
• The MD PnP supervisor sends pause and then resume at time t command to the MFM and
waits for an acknowledgment; if one is not received, an alarm sounded by the supervisor.
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• If an acknowledgment is received, the MD PnP supervisor then sends pause ventilator to the
device and waits for an acknowledgment; if one is not received, an alarm is sounded by the
supervisor.
• Before pause time reaches limit, the MD PnP supervisor may send resume ventilator command
to the MFM and waits for an acknowledgment; if one is not received, an alarm is sounded by the
supervisor.
• If an acknowledgment is received, the MD PnP supervisor sends resume ventilator command
to the device and waits for an acknowledgment; if one is not received, an alarm is sounded by
the supervisor.
• If the MFM stops receiving heartbeats from the MD PnP supervisor, an alarm sounds to warn
medical staff that the MD PnP supervisory loop has failed. The last command that supervisor
attempts to execute and recent command history are displayed. To further facilitate the failure
handling by medical staff, whenever the supervisor issues a command that puts the patient in a
transient safe state, it should annotate the command with a timed safety action. For example,
annotate the pause ventilator command with the note: pause at time t, to be resumed by (t +
30sec)
Figures 6.9(a) and 6.9(b) show the sequence of messages exchanged among the different components
of the automated open-loop safe MD PnP system in the normal and crash operation modes, receptively.
At the last step of our safety analysis procedure, we redraw the extended fault tree for brain damage.
First we present the necessary subtrees to re-draw the brain damage fault tree for IHM open-loop
safe MD PnP system. Figure 6.10(a) shows the MD PnP therapeutic configuration subtree when only
reliable device adapters are assumed, Subtree 4.1. The subtree for unsafe device configuration in the
IHM open-loop safe MD PnP system, Subtree 4.2, is shown in Figure 6.10(b). Having these two, we
present the brain damage fault tree for the IHM open-loop safe MD PnP system in Figure 6.11. The
highly reliable MFM in Subtree 4.2 and the AND gate on top of MD PnP and IHM open-loop safe
subbranches (depicted by dashed blue rectangles in Figure 6.11) results in removal of all paths to the
root.
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Figure 6.9: IHM Open-Loop Safe Sequence Diagram for Ventilator Configuration
6.4.2 Airway Laser Surgery
In this section we look at a slightly more complicated scenario of airway laser surgery. The airway-
laser operation is performed on the patient’s airway using a surgical laser when the patient is under
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Figure 6.10: MD PnP System with reliable Device Adapters and IHM Open-Loop Safe Subtrees
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anesthesia and breathing with the help of an endotracheal tube carrying air with a high concentration
of oxygen. Before the surgical phase starts, 100% FiO2 supplied by a ventilator is recommended
so that the surgery phase could be 1 to 5 minutes6. To prevent surgical fire, oxygen flow must be first
blocked before the laser is in use. If the oxygen flow is blocked for too long, the patient’s blood-oxygen
saturation can drop below the safe threshold and brain damage can occur.
To prevent surgical fire or brain damage hazards, the MD PnP supervisor should synchronize the
laser and O2 supply to ventilator. This process is performed through a series of communications be-
tween the supervisor and the medical devices. We use extended fault tree analysis to demonstrate the
behavior of the MD PnP supervisory system and determine whether there is a chain of events leading
to a hazardous situation. The fault tree analysis for brain damage is the same as the previous clinical
scenario; therefore, we focus on surgical fire hazard. This involves interaction of two medical devices:
surgical laser and ventilator. Figure 6.12 shows the extended fault tree for surgical fire. Similar to
brain damage, failure of the MD PnP components or communication network can lead to surgical fire.
The failure of the MD PnP supervisory loop prevents the correct commands received by the ventilator
6www.mc.vanderbilt.edu/documents/1anesthesiology/files/srna/Laser%20Surgery%20of%20the%20Airway.ppt
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Figure 6.12: Extended Fault Tree for Surgical Fire
and surgical laser devices on time. The dotted red line shows an example of a path from an MD PnP
component to the root of tree.
Automated Open-Loop Safe Approach for Airway Laser Surgical Scenario
In the airway laser surgical scenario, the MD PnP supervisor coordinates the airway laser and ventilator
(oxygen supply) devices to prevent brain damage or surgical fire. However, as can be seen in the fault
trees when there is a network or MD PnP supervisor failure and the supervisory loop becomes open,
the patient’s safety can be violated.
To prevent safety hazards when the supervisory loop becomes open, it is recommended to augment
the MD PnP system with an open-loop safety protocol. One simple version is presented in the previous
section for the laparoscopic cholecystectomy scenario. The same protocol can be used here; however,
in this case there are two devices whose actions must be coordinated by the MD PnP supervisor. The
open-loop safe supervisor ensures safety by sequentially sending timed action commands to the devices.
Figure 6.13 shows the sequence of communications among open-loop safety components, the MD
PnP components and medical devices.
At the last step of our safety analysis procedure, we redraw the extended fault tree for surgical fire
(Figure 6.14). The therapeutic configuration subtree for automated open-loop safe system, Subtree 3.2,
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Figure 6.14: Automated Open-Loop Safe MD PnP System Fault Tree Analysis for Surgical Fire Event
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is used to re-draw the fault tree. As presented on Subtree 3.2 in Figure 6.8(a), the automated open
loop safe supervisor may fail. However, the open loop safe protocol is any-step safe by definition; the
open-loop safe supervisor always ensures that the MD PnP device has received the timed safety action
before moving to a transient safe state. Moreover, the device adapters are assumed to be highly reliable.
Therefore, if the supervisory loop becomes open the adapter will move the device into a safe state. In
conclusion, assuming the initial configuration is safe, failure of the supervisory loop at any step of the
handshaking protocol will not result in an unsafe ventilator configuration. Finally, the addition of the
AND gate on top of MD PnP and open-loop safe subbranches (depicted by dashed blue rectangles in
Figure 6.14) results in removal of all paths to the root.
IHM Open-Loop Safe Approach for Airway Laser Surgical Scenario
As explained in the previous clinical example, timed safety commands executed by highly reliable
medical device adapters to enable automated open loop safety protocols is a preferred long term solu-
tion. However, a simple near term solution is to have a highly reliable MFM. The MD PnP supervisor
should follow the IHM protocol for sending commands to the ventilator and laser devices. The com-
munication between the MD PnP supervisor and the medical devices in airway laser surgical scenario
includes the following steps:
• The MD PnP supervisor sends a pause command annotated with ”to be resumed at time t” to
the MFM and waits for an acknowledgment; if one is not received, an alarm is sounded by the
supervisor.
• If an acknowledgment is received, the MD PnP supervisor then sends pause ventilator com-
mand and waits for an acknowledgment; if one is not received, an alarm is sounded by the
supervisor.
• After waiting for T seconds to ensure that the oxygen in patient’s airway is cleared, the MD PnP
supervisor sends turn on laser command to the MFM and waits for an acknowledgment; if one
is not received, an alarm is sounded by the supervisor.
• If an acknowledgment is received, the MD PnP supervisor sends turn on laser command to
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the device and waits for an acknowledgment; if one is not received, an alarm is sounded by the
supervisor to let medical staff know that the laser is not responding.
• When pause time limit reaches, the MD PnP supervisor sends turn off laser command first
to the MFM and then to the laser after an acknowledgment is received from the MFM. Next,
the supervisor waits for an acknowledgment; if one is not received, an alarm is sounded by the
supervisor.
• If an acknowledgment from laser is received, the MD PnP supervisor sends resume ventilator
command first to the MFM, and then to the ventilator after an acknowledgment is received from
the MFM. Next, the supervisor waits for an acknowledgment from the ventilator; if one is not
received, an alarm is sounded by the supervisor to let medical staff know that the ventilator is not
responding.
• During the operation, whenever the MFM stops receiving heartbeats from the MD PnP supervi-
sor, an alarm is sounded by the MFM to indicate that the MD PnP supervisory loop is open. In
addition, the list of recent commands is displayed.
Figures 6.15(a) and 6.15(b) show the sequence of messages exchanged among the different compo-
nents of the IHM open-loop safe MD PnP system in the normal and crash operation modes, receptively.
At the last step of our safety analysis procedure, we redraw the extended fault tree for surgical fire
(step S4). Figure 6.10(a) shows the MD PnP therapeutic configuration subtree when device adapters
are only assumed to be reliable (Subtree 4.1). The subtree for unsafe device configuration in the
IHM open-loop safe MD PnP system (Subtree 4.2) is shown in Figure 6.10(b). Figure 6.16 shows
the updated surgical fire tree that includes these subtrees. The addition of highly reliable MFM in
Subtree 4.2 and the AND gate on top of MD PnP and IHM open-loop safe subbranches (depicted by
dashed blue rectangles in Figure 6.16) results in removal of all paths to the root.
6.4.3 Patient Controlled Analgesia
The main adverse event in the patient controlled analgesia case is morphine overdose. This safety
hazard is shown under Unsafe Therapeutic Configuration ! Unsafe Medication Administration !
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Figure 6.15: IHM Open-Loop Safe Sequence Diagram for Airway-Laser Surgery
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Incorrect Bolus Dosage in Figure 6.25. The extended fault trees in this section show how this sub
branch is populated in the PCA case study.
The MD PnP system in this case includes a smart alarm application and a close loop control for
PCA pump. Failure of the smart alarm application to detect respiratory distress (Figure 6.17) or failure
of closed loop control to stop the pump on time (Figure 6.18) will lead to overdose. An open loop
safe solution is required to prevent these hazards when the supervisory loop is open. A simple version
can be setting a timer to stop the PCA pump when the supervisor or network crashes, before sending
the command to start the PCA pump. The timer value can be updated as the new physiological data
on patient state becomes available. The idea is similar to the previous cases; the open-loop supervisor
sends a sequence of timed actions to the PCA device starting with an action to ensure the PCA is moved
to a safe state when the MD PnP supervisor crashes or the network becomes unavailable. This approach
will break the paths, shown in Figures 6.17 and 6.18(a), to the root.
Figure 6.18(b) presents the case, in which the MD PnP closed-loop control application fails before
receiving an acknowledgment from the PCA device. To break this path to the root we recommend
the use of MFM that records the intent to deliver a dosage before actually sending the corresponding
command to the PCA device. If this action is not taken and the MD PnP system crashes after delivering
a dosage and before receiving the acknowledgment from the device, there would be no record of the
dosage administration, which will potentially lead to an overdose. Making a record of intention to
deliver a dosage can break this path to the root. In this case, even if the MD PnP supervisor crashes
after sending the command to the PCA and before receiving an acknowledgment from the device, the
intention to deliver a dosage is already recorded by the MFM.Therefore, when the MD PnP supervisor
restarts it can access this recorded information and avoid sending the commend to deliver another
dosage.
Note that fault trees include Subtree 4.1 representing unsafe therapeutic configuration, and Subtree 1
representing unsafe monitoring configuration in the MD PnP system. We presented Subtree 4.1 when
discussing brain damage and fire fault trees in the first two clinical examples; Subtree1 is introduced
later in the report when studying the MD PnP derived alarms.
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6.4.4 Prepare Intensive Care Unit to Receive Post-OP Cardiac Patient
The MD PnP supervisor reads the settings and status of medical devices used in the operating room,
when preparing an intensive care unit (ICU) for receiving post-op patients. This information includes
the medication and infusion rate for all IV pumps, the setting of mechanical ventilation, the number
of invasive pressure channels being monitored, etc. A simple handshaking process is recommended to
ensure that complete list of devices and corresponding setting is received by the MD PnP supervisor
in the intensive care unit. In the next step, all ICU medical devices are preset to OR settings by the
MD PnP supervisory application. The clinician confirms all automatic device settings and enters the
clinical data that cannot be retrieved automatically.
The MD PnP middleware must have a communication component to handle remotely accessing
medical devices connected to clinical network. Devices such as ventilator have different modes of
operation and settings. The translation and mapping of setting from one device to another are performed
by the interoperability component of the MD PnP middleware and must be verified as clinically correct.
We assume all medical devices use the same interface description language. The MD PnP middle-
ware can then provide a uniform format to clinical application designers for interacting with medical
devices. The middleware translates the uniform format to a specific device setting format. Therefore,
the complexity of heterogeneous devices will be hidden from the applications and encapsulated by the
MD PnP middleware. As explained above, we assume that the correctness of the MD PnP interoper-
ability logic is verified. Figure 6.19 shows the overall architecture of the MD PnP framework for the
clinical scenario involving preparation of ICU to receive post operation patients. The device configu-
ration setting must be verified by human before being applied to the devices in ICU and therefore no
device is directly manipulated by the MD PnP components. Therefore, there is no causal path from the
MD PnP components to potential safety hazards in this clinical scenario.
6.4.5 Home to Hospital
The data coming from telehealth (TH) monitoring devices, used at home, may be unreliable or in-
accurate. Inaccurate physiological measurements from these devices may be used in addition to more
accurate data from hospital devices to monitor patient state. However, this may result in unintentional
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Figure 6.19: The MD PnP System for Preparing ICU to Receive Post-OP Cardiac Patient
inaccuracy in patient state assessment. Properly managing the heterogeneity of medical sensors’ relia-
bility can alleviate this problem. One approach is exporting the information regarding the reliability of
different medical sensors to the application layer. Considering the accuracy of different medical sensor
readings when making decisions about patient state can increase the safety and effectiveness of the
patient monitoring process.
The MD PnP interoperability program recommends a unified model for medical sensors and phys-
iological measurements, which is defined as an abstraction of device and measurement information
relevant to the safety and effectiveness of patient care, including the accuracy of measurements. One
such model is shown in Table 6.4. Most of the chosen attributes for our measurement model are self-
describing. Some sensor devices generate more than one physiological measurement with different
accuracies. Therefore, accuracy information must be included for each pair of device and physiolog-
ical measurement. We show examples of the measurement model instantiation; the values stored in
the model instants are only nominal values. The fields can be populated as the information becomes
available.
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Physiology Monitor Type Device ID Patient ID Accuracy Current Reading
Blood Pressure Blood Pressure Cuff BP-ICU211 1236780 90% 80 mmHg
SpO2 Oximeter BP-Cuff-ICU211 1236780 97% 95%
Pulse Rate Oximeter Oximeter-ICU211 1234568 95% 100 bpm
Heart Rate EKG-TH EKG-1232211 1232211 95% 95 bpm
Heart Rhythm EKG EKG-ICU211 1236780 98% Sinus
ScvO2 Central Venous Catheter CVC-ICU211 1236780 99% 80%
CVP Central Venous Catheter CVC-ICU211 1236780 99% 80 mmHg
Table 6.4: Unified Device and Measurement Models
6.4.6 IV Sedation for a GI Procedure
The MD PnP framework aims at improving the safety and effectiveness of patient care by integrating
multiple devices for additional intelligence. For this clinical scenario, there are four major components
involved in creating a safer clinical environment with inter-operable medical devices. We look at each
component and analyze whether they can contribute to any of the known potential safety hazards.
Virtual display
The goal here is to have one integrated main display, which receives the clinical data from different
monitoring devices. For this scenario, SpO2, ETCO2 (end-tidal CO2), readings from a depth of
anesthesia monitor, respiratory rate and blood pressure can be displayed remotely on a central monitor.
However, the crash failure detection is simple and straightforward for a display. If the virtual display
crashes remote monitoring would not be possible; however, the clinical data are still displayed on
individual monitoring devices. Therefore, as long as it is verified that the virtual display will not alter
any value it receives from monitoring devices, this component will not cause any safety hazards.
Derived alarms
The main safety hazards for an MD PnP derived alarm system are 1) false negative alarms 2) false
positive alarms and 3) overlooked true positive alarms, which are the final result of false positive alarms.
Figures 6.20(a), 6.20(b), and 6.21 show the extended fault trees for alarm hazards. We name these three
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Figure 6.20: False Alarm Subtrees for MD PnP Derived Alarms
Subtree 1.1, Subtree 1.2, and Subtree 1.3, respectively. Using these subtrees, we draw the extended
fault tree for unsafe monitoring configuration in the MD PnP system (Figure 6.22).
To prevent failure of the MD PnP components from contributing to alarm safety hazards, some
precaution must be taken. The generic solution is to use MFM and take the IHM based approach, in
which:
• The MD PnP supervisor queries each device periodically.
• If a device fails to respond for n consecutive cycles, the supervisor sounds an alarm to notify
medical staff that device X has failed to communicate
• The MD PnP supervisor sends periodic heart beats to the highly reliableMFM.
• If the MFM fails to receive heartbeat from the MD PnP supervisor, then MFM sounds a local
alarm indicating that the supervisor has failed to respond and displays the recent commands.
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Figure 6.23: Extended Fault Tree Analysis for the MD PnP Virtual Front Panel
• Medical staff must enable all the local alarms in individual devices and restart the MD PnP
supervisor and go through all the safety checks.
Virtual front panel/ remote configuration
The extended fault tree for this component is shown in Figure 6.23. The root of this tree is unsafe
device configuration, which is remotely generated by this MD PnP component. This may include
incorrect setting of therapeutic devices such as ventilator, unsafe IV medication dosage, or incorrect
cutoff threshold values for monitoring devices. Therefore, it is critical to detect crash of the MD PnP
supervisory loop, using methods such as IHM protocol along with MFM. When crash of MD PnP
components is detected by MFM, a local alarm must be sounded to get the attention of medical staff.
The alarm would indicate that the remote front panel has crashed and the devices must be locally set
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by medical staff.
Autonomous control
The autonomous control component is responsible for implementing safety interlocks and physiolog-
ical closed loop controls. Verifying the logical correctness of this component is critical. The safety
interlock can prevent unsafe interaction between devices and treatment actions. One example is the
safety interlock between an oxygen controller and surgical laser in the airway laser surgical scenario.
Absence of such interlocks can directly endanger patient safety. In the case of closed loop control,
settings of therapeutic devices and IV medication are automatically controlled based on the current
readings from medical sensors. Therefore, incorrect control values can lead to unsafe therapeutic con-
figuration.
The execution of safety interlock and closed loop control steps can be interrupted when MD PnP
platform crashes and as shown in Figure 6.24 may lead to unsafe device operation. The near term
generic solution is to use the IHM open loop safety approach. Each step of the interlock protocol must
have a timed acknowledgment or an alarm will be raised by the MD PnP supervisor, which is in turn
monitored by the highly reliable MFM. However, it shall be user’s responsibility to verify the interlock
protocol together with IHM open loop safety approach, because currently there is no known general
proof that the generic open-loop safety protocol will be compatible with all possible interlock logics.
6.5 A Generic Approach for Safety Analysis of the MD PnP Systems
In this section we look at the steps of a safety analysis procedure for the generic MD PnP system. We
have looked at examples of potential safety hazards in clinical environments caused by incorrect and
unsafe medical device configuration. Figure 6.25 presents a general categorization of such potential
safety hazards. We consider three main sources of safety hazards: 1) unsafe monitoring configuration,
2) unsafe therapeutic configuration, and 3) unsafe interaction between monitoring and therapeutic con-
figurations. We have populated a subset of branches to demonstrate the general hierarchy. The brain
damage hazard explained in the previous section is an example of a hazard caused by an unsafe thera-
peutic configuration, specifically incorrect ventilator device setting. An example of interaction hazard
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Figure 6.24: Extended Fault Tree Analysis for the MD PnP Autonomous Control Systems
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Figure 6.26: Extended Fault Tree Analysis of the MD PnP System with Reliable Device Adapters
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is the surgical fire hazard that is caused by unsafe interaction of two therapeutic devices: ventilator and
surgical laser.
Step1: For each clinical scenario, enumerate the potential safety hazards and study the unsafe con-
figuration causing each hazard. As described in the previous section, use the extended fault tree to
demonstrate the system behavior leading to hazardous situations. Figure 6.26 shows a generic ex-
tended fault tree for the MD PnP system with reliable device adapters. The tree includes Subtree 4.1,
which was presented in Figure 6.10(a).
Step 2: Determine if there is a causal chain from the MD PnP components in the system to any
unsafe configuration causing the safety hazard. The root of this tree, indicated by Unsafe Device
Configuration, encompasses different safety hazards caused by unsafe device configuration. For each
clinical scenario, detailed information about specific device configuration and safety hazards substitutes
for this term in the generic tree. As presented in the example scenarios, there are potential paths from
the MD PnP components to unsafe configuration which ultimately results in a safety hazard. Note
that this is true for clinical scenarios, in which the medical devices are directly manipulated by the
MD PnP components. For example, in airway laser surgical scenario the MD PnP supervisor controls
and coordinates the actions to turn on, turn off and change the settings of ventilator (oxygen supply)
and surgical laser. Therefore, failure of any MD PnP component potentially leads to an unsafe device
configuration and ultimately surgical fire or brain damage.
For clinical cases in which the medical devices are directly manipulated by the MD PnP components,
we use an open-loop safe approach to prevent the failure of the MD PnP components from contributing
to potential safety hazards. We discussed two different approaches: Automated Open-Loop Safety and
IHM Open-Loop Safety.
Step 3 & 4 for Automated Open-Loop Safe Approach: Recommend an automated open-loop
safe solution and redraw the extended fault tree for each safety hazard. In the automated protocol,
we require highly reliable device adapters. A set of commands, including timed safety actions, are
sequentially sent to medical devices. At each step, we wait for an acknowledgment from the device
before sending the subsequent commands. When sending a command to move a device into a state,
which is only temporarily safe, first a safety timed action is sent to the device. This action will be taken
by the device if the MD PnP supervisory loop becomes open, and will move the device to a safe state
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after the specified time elapses. For example, in the laparoscopic cholecystectomy scenario, a timed
safety action, indicating that the ventilator must be resumed after a specific time period, is sent to the
ventilator. When the device acknowledges that the timer to resume the ventilator is set up, the MD
PnP supervisor sends the command to turn off the ventilator. Note that moving the ventilator to the
off state is only temporarily safe; therefore, the open loop safe protocol takes the safety precautions
before sending the corresponding command. Refer to Figures 6.7 and 6.13 for of message sequence
communicated between different components of the automated open-loop safe MD PnP system. This
approach ensures that the failure of the supervisory loop at any step during the communication will not
leave the system in an unsafe configuration, given the initial device configuration is safe. The main
components of the automated open-loop safe MD PnP system is shown in Figure 6.3.
At the last step of safety analysis procedure, we redraw the extended fault tree for each safety hazard.
The therapeutic configuration subtree for automated open-loop safe system, Subtree 3.2, was presented
in Figure 6.8(a). Figures 6.27(a), 6.27(b), and 6.27(c) show the extended fault trees for alarm hazards.
We name these three Subtree 2.1, Subtree 2.2, and Subtree 2.3, respectively. Using these subtrees,
we draw Subtree 2 for unsafe monitoring configuration in the automated open-loop safe MD PnP
system (Figure 6.28). Putting together the monitoring and therapeutic subtrees, we have the general
extended fault tree fort automated open-loop safe MD PnP system in Figure 6.29. As presented in
Subtree 3.2 and Subtree 2, the automated open loop safe supervisor may fail. However, the open loop
safe protocol is any-step safe; the open-loop safe supervisor always ensures that the MD PnP device has
received the timed safety action before moving to a transient safe state. Moreover, the device adapters
are assumed to be highly reliable devices. Therefore, if the supervisory loop becomes open, the adapter
will move the device into a safe state. In conclusion, assuming the initial configuration is safe, failure
of the supervisory loop at any step of the handshaking protocol will not result in unsafe ventilator
configuration. Finally, the addition of AND gate on top of MD PnP and open-loop safe subbranches
(depicted by dashed blue rectangles in Figure 6.29) results in removal of all paths to the root.
Step 3 & 4 for IHMOpen-Loop Safe Approach: Recommend an integrated human-machine open-
loop safe solution and redraw the extended fault tree for each safety hazard. The main components of
an IHM-based open-loop safe MD PnP system are shown in figure 6.4. The MFM must be highly
reliable, and should have its own power supply and a built-in alarm. The interface between timer and
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Figure 6.30: Extended Fault Tree Analysis of IHM Open-loop Safe MD PnP System
the MD PnP supervisor should be wired; USB port is one example. The medical device adapters, in this
design, only need to be cleared as reliable. Figures 6.9(a) and 6.15(a) show the sequence of messages
communicated between the different components of IHM open-loop safe MD PnP system for the first
two clinical examples.
At the last step, we redraw the fault tree for each safety hazard considering the IHM open-loop
safety approach in place. The subtrees for MD PnP system with reliable device adapters (Subtree 4.1)
and IHM open-loop safe system (Subtree 4.2) have been presented in Figures 6.10(a) and 6.10(b),
respectively. Figure 6.30 shows the general extended fault tree for the IHM open-loop safe MD PnP
system, drawn using these subtrees. The addition of highly reliable MFM and the AND gate on top
of MD PnP and IHM open-loop safe subbranches (depicted by dashed blue rectangles in Figure 6.30)
results in removal of all paths to the root.
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6.6 Summary
As noted on the Medical Device Plug-and-Play (MD PnP) program’s website, adoption of medical
device interoperability opens the door to significantly mitigate the preventable medical errors. The
goal of this program is to develop the technological foundation to design the next generation medical
systems. In an MD PnP system, medical devices are plugged in as needed, information from different
sources are fused, and medical actions are coordinated by providing an integrated clinical environment
(ICE).
On the other hand, the MD PnP middleware and applications run on top of commercial comput-
ing and communication platforms. There are no approved platforms by any agency that support plug
and play. This is because plug and play could generate new configurations not considered during the
approval process. Furthermore, all existing commercial platforms include a disclaimer indicating that
these platforms are not designed to be used for safety critical systems and applications. Therefore, we
need to consider its failure modes and the safety impacts on intended medical applications.
This document provides the guidelines to assist users to safely use the MD PnP system, which
typically consists of a commercial platform not designed for safety critical applications. We have
illustrated how to determine if the planned MD PnP system usage is a causal factor in the known safety
hazards of a medical procedure. We used extended fault tree for safety analysis of MD PnP systems.
The need for safety engineering expertise and domain knowledge is known as a limiting factor in the
use of fault tree analysis. Ensuring comprehensiveness of fault trees is a challenging task. In complex
systems, it is possible to miss some system behavior, which can contribute to the safety hazards not
presented in the analysis but exists in real world systems. Thus, for safety critical MD PnP system, the
extended fault tree analysis should be approved.
Should the MD PnP usage be a causal factor of safety hazards, we provided guidelines to transform
the configuration so that it is no longer a causal factor. We discussed long term and near term solutions:
• The long solution requires device makers to support simple timed safety actions.
• The near term solutions for existing medical devices is to use aMedical Failover Manager (MFM)
to remind users to perform the timed safety actions.
137
When the MD PnP system’s output are used to manipulate safety critical medical devices, we recom-
mend using MFM and following the IHM handshaking protocol, even when the MD PnP sends safety
critical medical devices commands, which are first reviewed and approved by medical staff. Keeping
an accurate record for what the MD PnP supervisor has done will be invaluable for post operation
analysis, especially settling disputes if any. Hence, MFM’s record system should be protected from
tampering by unauthorized users.
6.7 Research Publications
The chapter is being prepared for submission to Journal of Medical Systems:
• M. Rahmaniheris, L. Sha, and Sandy Weininger ”A Framework for the Safe Use of MD PnP
Systems”
The following is an earlier publication of our research on safety of MD PnP systems, which are
developed using commercial computation and communication equipments:
• C. Kim, M. Sun, M. Rahmaniheris and L. Sha, ”How to Reliably Integrate Medical Devices
Over Wireless Network”, 9th Annual IEEE Communications Society Conference on Sensor,
Mesh and Ad Hoc Communications and Networks (SECON), 2012 [93]
138
Chapter 7
Discussion & Future Work
In this thesis, we have proposed an organ-centric pathophysiology-based modeling paradigm, where
we translate the medical text into executable interactive disease and organ automata. This is possible
because disease and organ states are already discretized by the medical community, for example, dif-
ferent stages of cancer, diabetes, heart diseases, etc. We model the patient state and different disease
stages according to pathophysiology of organ systems, which describes how each of the organ functions
are affected by the disease. Furthermore, the diagnosis and treatment are organized for each stage. We
studied two applications: cardiac arrest and sepsis. The developed models are then integrated into a
model-driven best practice guidance system. We have conducted a preliminary clinical evaluation in an
ACLS training class at Carle hospital, to validate the clinical correctness and usefulness of the cardiac
arrest models and our model-driven resuscitation guidance system.
Many of our major clinical requirements originate from an important subset of IOM recommenda-
tions [2, 94]. According to the feedbacks from domain experts, we believe that the proposed system
can reduce preventable medical errors by addressing one of the important recommendations by this in-
stitute: ”avoid reliance on memory and vigilance” (p.170 [2]). Furthermore, we believe our system can
help with adherence to best practice monitoring and treatment plans. This specifically addresses one of
the common errors made in resuscitation of cardiac arrest, failure to anticipate the next step [61].
The proposed medical knowledge representation and modeling methodology must be able to model
different diseases in acute care. Initially, we have used the cardiac arrest case study when developing
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our model. However, to evaluate the applicability of our proposed modeling paradigm, different dis-
eases or acute care scenarios must be considered. A more complex case study such as sepsis, which is
a life-threatening organ dysfunction caused by a regulated host response to infection, can be extremely
useful in evaluating the applicability of modeling paradigm. It should be noted that we are collaborating
with Carle hospital ICU on the development of a best practice sepsis guidance system.
Despite all the capabilities and potentials of our proposed modeling paradigm, there are several
important limitations that deserve consideration. They may seem to be out of our scope; nonetheless,
we believe discussing these issues may provide the reader with a more clear understanding of scope
and focus of this thesis. Furthermore, we plan on addressing some of the issues as part of our future
work.
7.1 Model’s Level of Fidelity
The models in stateflow and UPPAAL are very abstract and do not cover all physiological dynamics
of the organ function, we need to consider how they can track the organ state with sufficient fidelity.
Following that, we must explain how we determine ”What is sufficient fidelity?”. Furthermore, if some
organs are modeled with more detail and others with cumulative/aggregate state models, one might
wonder how this multi-scale modeling does not lose the necessary fidelity and how it allows us to focus
on the primary organs.
The models developed according to our current approach, are used to improve compliance with best
practice. To reach this goal, the model must remind the medical staff of the best practice monitoring
and treatment guidelines needs to be performed as the patient state changes. Therefore, we define
the model level of fidelity as the degree to which the model can help encode and track the critical
changes in physiological functions of different organ systems that physician needs to know so he/she
can follow best practice monitoring and treatment guidelines. We determine the sufficient fidelity,
based on physician’s input and best practice literature for each case study. To ensure the sufficient
fidelity of the model, when constructing the models we apply a set of development guidelines, such as
the following:
• If the physician only wants to know about the degree of renal insufficiency, we aggregate the
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information regarding the kidney pathophysiology as degree of insufficiency
• Different concurrent machines are used to track simultaneous changes
• Actionable states allows us to encode the critical changes that require medical staff to perform a
new action
We then validate the sufficient fidelity of the models through clinical simulation, which allows our
physician collaborators to validates the clinical (fidelity) requirements against the simulated models.
7.2 Variability and Uncertainty
An important challenge in the domain of clinical modeling is accounting for variability of pathophys-
iological processes (and observed signals in terms of rates/thresholds) both within the same patient (at
different times of the day, under medication, etc.) and across the patient population. Such variability
must be expressed (in terms of the signals, thresholds and distributions of rates) and the models must
be calibrated to capture pathophysiological states with some confidence. This is not an easy question,
however, we need to discuss how variability, and uncertainty in general, can be handled throughout the
model.
The current approach only partially addresses this challenge by allowing the user to configure the
cutoff thresholds in the beginning. However, additional information are most likely required to account
for the variability among different patients as well the same patient in different contexts. Furthermore,
the information required to determine these values might not be available at configuration time.
We believe this issue can be addressed effectively by developing parametric models. The variability
mostly affects the definition of transitions between different pathophysiological states. The fixed state
transition guards can be substituted with functions of patient-specific parameters, to cover the variabil-
ity across the patient population, or more fine-grained patient state parameters, to cover the variability
for the same patient. The parameters may include age, gender, existing chronic diseases, medications,
treatment history for the past n hours, etc. At the beginning, the system can ask the attending physician
to enter the values for these parameters; throughout the care process they can be updated as new patient
information becomes available.
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The choice of parameters and function definitions (how each of these parameters affect the transition
guards) are clinical knowledge. The model can encode them, only if such knowledge exist. They can
be extracted from best practice or provided by physicians. Additionally, calibration, that is systematic
adjustment of parameter choices and transition function definitions, can be performed offline with
the help of our physician collaborators. However, note that the goal of our models is not improving
the fidelity of pathophysiological process or calibrating them. We just encode the available medical
knowledge.
7.3 Hysteresis in the Model
The current models detect changes in pathophysiological states when the corresponding state vari-
ables cross some predefined thresholds. However, this may result in hysteresis, that is the lagging of an
effect (change in physiological measurements) behind its cause (organ insufficiency), in the model.
Note that predictive models is out of our scope; therefore, we limit ourselves to quantifying the delay
distribution from the state change to the observed signal crossing a threshold, for the case studies. Using
the available time kinetics of different pathophysiological processes, we can calculate the time elapsed
from onset of the insufficiency (when measurement crosses the baseline), to the time the corresponding
measurement crosses the predefined threshold in our model.
As an example we use creatinine kinetics in renal insufficiency [95]. Let G be the generation rate
of creatinine; C, the serum creatinine concentration; V , the volume of distribution of creatinine ; and
K, creatinine clearance. Note thatK is different for each patient and for the same patient, it decreases
rapidly, as the degree of renal insufficiency grows. The creatinine level can be computed at time t using
the following formula:
C(t) = G/K + [C(0) G/K] ⇤ e Kt/V
The time required for serum creatinine to increase from C(0) to C(t) can be described by the fol-
lowing formula:
t =  V/K ⇤ ln[(C(t) G/K)/(C(0) G/K)]
When renal function is normal K 2 [0.87   1.39 dL/min]. When renal insufficiency develops K
can drop to 0.5 dL/min and for severe renal insufficiency can drop below 0.15 dl/min. G 2 [0.4 2.0
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dL/min] but can decrease when renal insufficiency develops.
Using the above formula we can, for example, estimate the time delay from the point moderate
renal insufficiency has developed (creatinine = 3.8mg/dL) until the threshold in our renal model is
crossed (creatinine = 5.0mg/dL);K is set to 0.15 dL/min; G to 1.5 dL/min, and V to 400 dL:
t =  400/0.15 ⇤ ln[(5.0  10.0)/(3.8  10.0)] ' 530minutes ' 8 hours
7.4 Early Identification of At-Risk Patients
As mentioned above, predictive models are out of scope of this thesis. However, we also believe that
developing probabilist organ-centric models can be extremely useful for early identification of at-risk
patients. A great example of such use cases is sepsis. Every hour of delay in treatment of septic patients
reduces the survival rate by 8% [96]. By adjusting the extent and frequency of monitoring for at-risk
patients sepsis can be detected and managed as early as possible. Since frequent monitoring for every
patient is not feasible and cost effective, the identification of at-risk patients can reduce the cost of care
as well.
We believe using the combination of dynamic Bayesian networks and state machines to represent and
track patient state can greatly improve the effectiveness of sepsis screening and management process.
Bayesian Network (BN) is a probabilistic graphical model that represents a set of random variables and
their conditional dependencies via a directed acyclic graph [97]. Dynamic BN (DBN) is a Bayesian
network, which relates variables to each other over adjacent time steps [98]. Several techniques based
on BN and DBN have been proposed for screening and management of sepsis [99], [100], [101]. How-
ever, they often categorize the patients into septic and non-septic categories. No further information on
patient state or monitoring guidelines are provided for the latter category. Furthermore, the networks
developed and used in these techniques may become complex and unmanageable as more clinical cri-
teria for sepsis screening is added to improve the prediction performance.
Using state-based Bayesian analysis, we can develop modular Bayesian networks and encode differ-
ent sub-networks in different pathophysiological states. We then calculate the risk of a patient moving
toward an insufficiency state. Combining the risk-based analysis with rate calculation (how fast the
patient is deteriorating) the model can provide useful information regarding patient state before the
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thresholds are actually crossed. The guidelines on extent and frequency of monitoring can also be
encoded in the states. In this way, the screening and monitoring frequency and extent can be auto-
matically adjusted as the patient state changes. For conditional probability distribution initialization
existing epidemiological data may be used [102].
7.5 Medical System Safety
One of the potential benefits of our approach that can be exploited in the future is linking local
medical device (ICE) system [50] to the developed pathophysiology-based models and have settings/-
monitor values automatically communicated. Note that we may still require the human in the loop but
integrating our executable models with ICE system allows automating getting and sending medical de-
vice interface data. As shown in Figure 7.1, the model-driven guidance system can interface with ICE
supervisor. Note that the suspected patient state(s) and the corresponding guidelines are displayed for
the attending physician; they can confirm the patient state(s) suggested by the system or choose a dif-
ferent diagnosis. If confirmed, the subset of corresponding best practice guidelines involving medical
devices, can be translated to device settings and sent out to the ICE supervisor.
In this thesis, we assume that the medial best practice guidelines would produce the best clinical out-
come and our work assist medical staff to avoid unintended deviations from these guidelines. However,
as noted by Dr. Sandy Weininger,
Assuring the safety of automated medical systems requires addressing many level of gover-
nance and control, such as the practice of medicine, disease states and physiology, device
states and responses. Linking all of these together (in some kind of mixed mode simulation)
will be necessary in the future to assess the system performance as they are too complex to
validate in vivo.
Our modeling approach can be incorporated in such mixed-mode simulation, encoding and tracking
the disease and pathophysiological state information according to best practice guidelines as well as
physician belief at each state. These are indeed serious challenges that should be addressed in the
future.
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Figure 7.1: Model Integration into Local Medical Device (”ICE”) System
7.6 User Acceptance
Medicine is complex and physician often needs to make decisions under subjective uncertainty.
Trust can greatly affect the reliance on the guidance provided by our system. Trust in automation,
or system-generated guidelines in our case, develops according to the information available [103].
Providing information on model’s confidence in its generated guidance could foster acceptance/trust.
As part of our future work, we will compute context-aware probability and risk values for different
pathophysiological states encoded in the model, using state-based Bayesian analysis. Furthermore, we
will identify the minimum required clinical data that must be available for each guideline item. The
system can then update its confidence in the corresponding guideline item as additional clinical data
becomes available, since new data may provide further evidence supporting the generated guidance.
Another way in which, trust can be further derived is from an understanding of the underlying
mechanisms or observation of the system behavior [104]. We must provide an intuitive representation
of not only the state of patient, but also the guidance process state (current and last n states). We can also
display the process of generating the guideline items by revealing intermediate states/results in a way
145
that can be easily understood by medical staff. In other words, we supplement the displayed guidance
with ”What the Machine is Thinking?”. Similar to flight control systems, we can also display the safe
and effective next treatment actions and the corresponding parameters (treatment safety envelope).
The chosen actions by medical staff can be overlaid on the safety envelope, for visual representation of
potential deviations.
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